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ABSTRACT—Adopted in 1793, the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) has come to
symbolize the early republic’s concern with protecting state court
autonomy from an overbearing federal judiciary. Modern observers view
the AIA and its prohibition of injunctions to stay state court proceedings as
an absolute barrier to federal interposition. All agree that the origins of the
Act were, as the Supreme Court observed, “shrouded in obscurity.”
To remove the shroud, we return to an eighteenth-century world in
which separate courts of law and equity exercised concurrent jurisdiction,
and courts of equity secured their role through injunctions to stay
proceedings at law. One such proceeding unfolded in North Carolina, as
founding financier Robert Morris attempted to stay the enforcement of an
adverse state court judgment. The language of the AIA was likely drafted
to address the specific problem of federal–state concurrency laid bare in
that case, Morris v. Allen. By limiting its restriction to “writs of
injunction,” the AIA barred original federal interposition but left the
federal courts free to issue ancillary stays to protect federal jurisdiction and
federal decrees. Reclaiming this lost distinction between original and
ancillary injunctive relief calls for a fundamental reconsideration of the
place of the 1793 Act in the legislative output of the early republic. Far
from the absolute bar that it later became in the hands of twentieth-century
jurists such as Felix Frankfurter, the 1793 Act struck a balance that
protected state court autonomy even as it authorized federal judicial selfdefense.
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INTRODUCTION
While a variety of different themes crop up in historical treatments of
the Anti-Injunction Act of 1793 (AIA),1 scholars agree that the statute’s
origins are “shrouded in obscurity” or “lost in the mists of history.”2 This
narrative of historical obscurity informs the work of those, like Professor
Charles Warren, who viewed the AIA’s declaration that no “writ of
injunction” shall be issued to stay proceedings in state courts3 as a “firm
bar” against federal court interference.4 Similar claims of obscurity animate
the work of such historians as William Mayton and Wythe Holt, both of
1

Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334–35. The modern AIA is codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283 (2006).
2
See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232–33 (1972) (footnote omitted) (“The precise
origins of the legislation are shrouded in obscurity, but the consistent understanding has been that its
basic purpose is to prevent ‘needless friction between state and federal courts.’” (quoting Okla. Packing
Co. v. Gas Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940))); 17A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4221 (3d ed. 2011) (footnote omitted) (“Why Congress [adopted the AIA] in 1793 is lost
in the mists of history. There is no record of debate in Congress about it, and historians have only been
able to speculate inconclusively about the motivation for the statute.”); Edgar Noble Durfee & Robert
L. Sloss, Federal Injunction Against Proceedings in State Courts: The Life History of a Statute,
30 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1932) (“We know next to nothing of the parliamentary history of this
statute.”); Telford Taylor & Everett I. Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in
State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169, 1170–72 (1933) (describing the history as a matter of “some
uncertainty”).
3
§ 5, 1 Stat. at 335.
4
Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 367 (1930) (“[T]he
very explicit words of the statute have been considerably stretched by the Court so as to admit of
implied exceptions, and substantial breaches have been made in this apparently firm bar against federal
interference.”).
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whom regard the AIA as limiting only the power of a single circuit-riding
Justice and as leaving the injunctive power of federal courts entirely intact.5
The Supreme Court itself appears to have subscribed to the narrative of
historical inaccessibility even as it continues to work out a complex body
of law to govern the relations between state and federal courts.6
The relatively thin historical record has left ample room for scholarly
theorizing.7 Some view the AIA as the brainchild of its draftsman,
Connecticut Senator (and future Chief Justice) Oliver Ellsworth, who was
known for his general antipathy to equity.8 Others have linked the AIA to
Edmund Randolph, the Attorney General whose lengthy 1790 Report
proposed broad reforms to the Judiciary Act of 1789 and included a
provision (or two) much like the AIA.9 But some scholars have dismissed
the Randolph connection on two grounds: that Congress did not, as a
general matter, take up his reforms, and that the particular provision that
5

See Wythe Holt & James R. Perry, Writs and Rights, “Clashings and Animosities”: The First
Confrontation Between Federal and State Jurisdictions, 7 LAW & HIST. REV. 89 (1989); William T.
Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 330, 332 (1978)
(“Instead of erecting a bar applicable to all federal courts, Congress in 1793 seems to have enacted only
a law prohibiting a single Justice of the Supreme Court from enjoining a state court proceeding.”); see
also John Daniel Reaves & David S. Golden, Commentary, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute in the
Aftermath of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 5 GA. L. REV. 294, 297–98 (1971).
6
See Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 232 (describing the origins of the Act as “shrouded in obscurity”).
Nonetheless, the Court has drawn on the AIA in working out problems of federal–state concurrency.
See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971) (“Since the beginning of this country’s history
Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free
from interference by federal courts. . . . A comparison of the 1793 Act with 28 U.S.C. § 2283, its
present-day successor, graphically illustrates how few and minor have been the exceptions granted from
the flat, prohibitory language of the old Act.”).
7
This dearth of legislative history is exacerbated by the fact that the Supreme Court did not decide
a case in express reliance on the AIA until 1872. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 719–20
(1872). Notably, the Court has sometimes treated its 1807 decision in Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) 179 (1807), as an early application of the AIA. See, e.g., Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314
U.S. 118, 134 & n.5 (1941); Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 625 (1849).
8
See Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1171 (suggesting “that the inclusion of the injunction
provisions [in the 1793 Act] was the result in part of then prevailing prejudices against equity
jurisdiction” and observing that “Ellsworth had a pronounced dislike for chancery practice”); id.
(observing that Ellsworth “at one time joined forces with anti-federalists in urging an amendment to the
first Judiciary Act of 1789 which would have required that the facts in federal equity suits be found by a
jury”); see also WILLIAM MACLAY, SKETCHES OF DEBATE IN THE FIRST SENATE OF THE UNITED
STATES, IN 1789–90–91, at 94, 99 (George W. Harris ed., Harrisburg, Lane S. Hart Printer & Binder
1880) (observing that, during debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, Ellsworth found himself opposing
Morris—then a Senator from Pennsylvania—on that very topic: whereas Ellsworth was “generally . . .
for limiting the chancery powers,” Morris “seemed almost disposed to join” members of the House who
sought “to push the power of Chancery as far as possible”).
9
See EDMUND RANDOLPH, REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL TO THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (DEC. 31, 1790) [hereinafter RANDOLPH’S REPORT], reprinted in 4 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789–1800, at 122, 127,
162–63 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter DHSC]; Warren, supra note 4, at 347 (arguing
that the AIA was “undoubtedly” adopted in consequence of Randolph’s Report).
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some portray as a precursor to the AIA was part of a project (aimed at more
completely separating the state and federal courts) that Congress chose not
to implement.10
An equally intriguing and problematic suggestion appears in the
editorial notes of the indispensable Supreme Court Documentary History
project.11 The editors of the project hypothesize that the AIA may have
sought to calm the waters in the wake of a particularly controversial
petition for certiorari in Morris v. Allen, a debt-related dispute between
Founding Era banker Robert Morris and a group of North Carolina
merchants. Morris sought to remove the case to federal court after what he
viewed as a series of flawed state court proceedings—a litigation strategy
that resulted in an early clash between the state and federal courts in North
Carolina.12 But that hypothesis presents a puzzle: the Morris controversy
arose from the use of certiorari to remove an action from state to federal
court, posing the question why the drafters of the Act would ban the
issuance of writs of injunctions to address the concern. As we will see,
certiorari was a common law process that effected the removal of an action
from an inferior to a superior court.13 A statute (like the AIA) that bars the
federal courts from issuing writs of injunction to state courts would not
foreclose issuance of writs of certiorari if otherwise appropriate, and it
would not foreclose the use of a body attachment (contempt) as a mode of
enforcing obedience to the certiorari. Nor would a ban on injunctions
address the implication of state court inferiority embedded in the federal
courts’ reliance on certiorari—reliance that helped to inflame passions in
North Carolina following Morris.14
Our examination of the AIA has revealed an important textual wrinkle
that we think will clarify the meaning and purpose of the Act. As noted
above, the AIA prohibited the issuance of “writs of injunction” to stay
proceedings in state courts and seemingly brooks no exception.15 But when
we view the Act’s reference to “writs of injunction” against the backdrop
of practice in the Anglo-American Courts of Chancery, we find an
important distinction between original and ancillary proceedings. Most
suits brought in equity to stay proceedings at law were commenced through
the submission of an original bill of injunction, which was served on the
opposing party along with a subpoena, and which would (if successful)
10

See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 122–27.
See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 202 n.9.
12
Among other important events, the materials offer a more detailed portrait of the controversial
attempt of Morris, a prominent Pennsylvania merchant and financier, to remove litigation from state to
federal court in North Carolina. See id.; see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5.
13
See Harold Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review by Prerogative Writ: Certiorari and
Mandamus, 9 N.Y.L.F. 478, 504 (1963).
14
See Declaration of the Judges of the Superior Court of North Carolina (Nov. 19, 1790), in 2
DHSC, supra note 9, at 111, 111–12 [hereinafter Declaration of North Carolina Judges].
15
See Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335.
11
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result in the issuance of a writ of injunction against further proceedings.16
In addition to these original actions for writs of injunction, courts of equity
also entertained motions or petitions for the issuance of ancillary relief in
the nature of an injunction to protect their jurisdiction and ensure the
effectiveness of their decrees.17 From Chancery’s perspective, the original
bill for a writ of injunction initiated an action and brought parties before the
court with proper notice through service.18 The ancillary injunction on
motion, by contrast, operated on those who were already parties to an
equitable proceeding and were subject to equitable control.19 We think the
AIA was drafted to pick up this distinction, barring only original
applications for the “writ of injunction” but leaving federal courts of equity
free to grant ancillary relief, including injunctive relief, against state court
proceedings that threatened prior federal litigation.
We tell the story of the AIA in three parts. Part I briefly summarizes
scholarly assessments of the Act’s origins. Part II focuses on the Morris
case, using that litigation as a window into the distant and yet somewhat
familiar world of eighteenth-century litigation. Part II also explores the
strategic challenges that confronted the lawyers for Robert Morris as they
tried to steer the case into a federal forum, and it recounts the reaction of
the state court to the federal certiorari. Part III closely examines the
language of the AIA in light of the equitable distinction between original
bills for writs of injunction and ancillary proceedings to effectuate a decree.
Part III also shows that the distinction helps to clarify most (but not all)
confusing features of anti-suit injunctions in the nineteenth century. A brief
conclusion follows.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: ACCOUNTS OF THE AIA’S ORIGINS
Scholarship on the Anti-Injunction Act nicely reflects the concerns of
the day in which it was written (and tends to confirm a lasting truth about
historically informed legal scholarship). Then-Professor Felix Frankfurter
helped to inspire a growing interest in the statute at a time when
16

See, e.g., Lecture LVI: Of Injunction Causes, in 3 RICHARD WOODDESSON, LECTURES ON THE
LAW OF ENGLAND 158, 158 (W.R. Williams ed., Philadelphia, John S. Littell 1842) (footnotes omitted)
(“Injunction causes are those, in which the bill prays, besides the writ of subpoena to compel the
defendant to appear and answer, a writ also of injunction, inhibiting him from suing the complainant at
common law . . . . For, generally, it is requisite, that he who seeks an injunction, should have a bill filed
in court at the time. Yet in cases specially circumstanced, this has been dispensed with.”).
17
See, e.g., Morrice v. Bank of Eng., (1736) 36 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ch.); 3 Swanst. App. 573; Cas. t.
Talbot 217, 226; 2 Bro. P.C. (Toml. ed.) 465.
18
See JOHN WYATT, THE PRACTICAL REGISTER IN CHANCERY 237 (London, A. Strahan 1800)
(“No injunction for stay of suit at law shall be granted, revived, dissolved, or stayed, upon a petition,
nor any injunction of any other nature pass by order upon petition, without notice and a copy of the
petition first had by, or given to the other side . . . .”).
19
See, e.g., Morrice, Cas. t. Talbot at 223 (suggesting that the Court viewed the power to grant an
injunction against enforcement of judgments as essential to carry its jurisdiction into effect).
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Progressive Era distrust of federal equity was at its height.20 Justice
Frankfurter’s own 1941 opinion in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co.
signaled an end to freewheeling federal court assertions of injunctive
authority and invoked the Act’s origins in the course of inviting Congress
to define the power of federal courts to enjoin state proceedings.21 By the
1970s, students of federal jurisdiction argued for a broader federal judicial
role in enforcing constitutional rights and offered a correspondingly
narrower vision of the AIA.22 Echoes from the Warren Court’s expansion
of equitable power to enforce civil rights continue to reverberate.23
Beneath these broad patterns, one finds pockets of consensus as well
as areas of disagreement. Perhaps the most widely accepted view is that we
lack a detailed legislative history of the statute.24 This is due in large part to
the fact that we cannot reconstruct the debates in either the House or the
Senate.25 House debates in 1793 were only intermittently recorded, often by
newspapers.26 Meanwhile, the Senate’s proceedings were closed to the
20

See Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1169 n.† (dedicating their article to Professor Felix
Frankfurter); cf. Warren, supra note 4, at 346 (noting that the “hasty” assumption of federal jurisdiction
in challenges to the constitutionality of state laws had aroused “public antagonism” and led to demands
on Congress to curtail federal jurisdiction).
21
See 314 U.S. 118, 139, 141 (1941) (reversing an injunction issued to prevent relitigation in state
court on the ground that the text of the AIA allowed for no judge-made exceptions).
22
See, e.g., Mayton, supra note 5 (arguing that the Act applied only to the work of a single Justice
riding the circuit and left lower federal courts free as courts to enjoin state proceedings).
23
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 736 & n.5 (5th ed. 2007) (describing
Mayton’s account as a persuasive showing); Wythe Holt, “The Federal Courts Have Enemies in All
Who Fear Their Influence on State Objects”: The Failure to Abolish Supreme Court Circuit-Riding in
the Judiciary Acts of 1792 and 1793, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 336–37 & n.145 (1987) (expressing
agreement with Mayton’s view that the Act limited only the power of a single Justice).
24
See Durfee & Sloss, supra note 2, at 1145 (“We know next to nothing of the parliamentary
history of this statute.”); Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1170–72 (describing the history as a matter of
“some uncertainty”); cf. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 232 (1972) (describing the origins of the Act
as “shrouded in obscurity”).
25
See 17A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2; Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1170 n.9 (“It is apparent
from the Annals, however, that there was considerable debate which is not reported.” (citing 3 ANNALS
OF CONG. 607, 645, 875, 882 (1792–1793))).
26
See, e.g., H. JOURNAL, 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 663 (1793) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The
Senate have passed a bill, entitled An act in addition to the act, entitled An act to establish the Judicial
Courts of the United States; to which they desire the concurrence of this House. . . . The bill sent from
the Senate, entitled An act in addition to the act, entitled An act to establish the Judicial Courts of the
United States, was read the first time.”); id. at 705 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“The House . . .
resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole House on the bill sent from the Senate, entitled An act in
addition to the act, entitled An act to establish the judicial courts of the United States; and, after some
time spent therein, Mr. Speaker resumed the chair, and Mr. Steele reported that the committee had,
according to order, had the said bill under consideration, and made several amendments thereto; which
he delivered in at the Clerk’s table, where the same were severally twice read, and agreed to by the
House. Ordered, That the said bill, with the amendments, do lie on the table.”).
Records are available in the Annals of Congress, but they were compiled decades later using, for
the most part, newspaper accounts. See Annals of Congress, LIBR. CONGRESS AM. MEMORY, http://
memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwac.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
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public, and the debates were not transcribed.27 No House or Senate report
accompanied the measure, as it would today, and we therefore lack an
official account of what the legislation was meant to achieve.28
The absence of an official account has opened the way to a measure of
scholarly speculation, more or less well-informed, about the likely origins
and purpose of the AIA.29 Scholars generally agree that the Judiciary Act of
1793 came about in response to President George Washington’s suggestion
in November 1792 that Congress consider revisions to the judiciary
system.30 Washington’s suggestion reflected concerns that the Justices had
expressed about the burdens of circuit riding; he enclosed a
“representation” from the Justices which described circuit riding as “too
burthensome” and criticized the portion of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that
called upon Justices to sit in review of decisions they had made as circuit
judges.31 But the linkage to circuit-riding concerns may itself serve to
obscure the Act’s purpose. Professor Mayton, for example, argued that the
anti-injunction provision meant to qualify only the power of a single Justice
on circuit, and thus left the injunctive power of “courts” fully intact.32
The possible relevance of the Randolph Report also plays a recurrent
but somewhat unsettled role in the scholarly debate.33 In August 1790,
27

Senator Maclay’s journal, which gave “meaning and life to the journal record,” only covers the
years 1789–1791 and so, with regard to post-1791 legislation like the AIA, “it is impossible to follow
with any assurance of a right comprehension the votes and other officially recorded acts of any
senator.” WILLIAM GARROTT BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 208 (1905).
28
See Mayton, supra note 5, at 336 (noting the absence of recorded debates); Taylor & Willis,
supra note 2, at 1170 (same); see also 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 200–03 (recounting the legislative
history of the Act from the evolution of drafts and contemporaneous correspondence).
29
For example, Professor Warren speculated that the Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), upholding the suability of states, may have offended the states and helped
build support for limits on federal judicial power. See Warren, supra note 4, at 347–48. But Warren’s
account has gained little traction in the literature. See, e.g., Mayton, supra note 5, at 335 n.35 (rejecting
the linkage to Chisholm on the ground that the Senate draft of the Act preceded the Chisholm decision
by several weeks).
30
See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 201.
31
See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 289–90 (reproducing a “representation,” dated August 9, 1792,
from the Justices to Congress). By assigning individuals appointed as Justices of the Supreme Court the
additional task of serving as circuit judges, the Act of 1789 created the possibility that actions taken by
circuit-riding Justices would come before the full Court for further review. See Judiciary Act of 1789,
ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75. Circuit riding had long been a painful duty for the Justices; their
complaints dated from the summer after they concluded their first round. See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at
3–4 (editor’s note) (dating the Justices’ objections to the propriety of requiring the same individuals to
serve as judges of both a supreme and inferior court to August 1790). The salary structure in place at
the time may have complicated the task of according relief; the Justices’ salary had been set to cover the
cost of travel associated with circuit riding and Congress could not, in keeping with Article III, reduce
that salary if and when it chose to reduce the Justices’ circuit obligations. See James E. Pfander,
Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1, 32–34 (2008).
32
See Mayton, supra note 5, at 332–38.
33
See infra Part III.A (discussing Randolph’s Report).
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Congress asked Randolph, the nation’s first Attorney General, for a report
on the federal judicial system.34 The fact that Randolph’s Report and the
AIA both discuss writs of ne exeat and injunction in closely related
provisions might explain why some scholars have seen a connection
between the two.35 Others have been less sure that Randolph’s Report was a
precursor to the AIA.36 Finally, scholars have put forward a range of views
about the possible relevance of the Morris certiorari litigation.37 Scholars
associated with the Documentary History project in particular have
suggested that the Morris certiorari may have led, in some indirect way, to
the adoption of the AIA.38
These accounts all help to identify fruitful lines of inquiry but omit a
crucial part of the story: the fact that courts of equity were generally free to
relitigate matters decided by courts of law and to enjoin the parties from
enforcing any judgments they had obtained previously. The Morris
litigation presented this problem of federal equitable relitigation in sharp
relief; the federal circuit court had issued a writ of certiorari to secure the
removal of the action from state to federal court, but the relief sought in the
removed action was an injunction against the enforcement of a previous
state court judgment.39 In other words, Morris had invited the federal court
to take over a state court proceeding in equity that had been brought to
challenge on equitable grounds the merits of an action previously resolved
by the state’s courts of law. We think, as we discuss in the next Part, that
the AIA was meant to foreclose this particular form of federal equitable
relitigation, avoiding the problem of bifurcated proceedings identified in
Randolph’s Report. Morris v. Allen40 brought these issues to a head.

34

See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 122 & n.2.
See Warren, supra note 4, at 347 (declaring that the AIA was “undoubtedly” drafted in
consequence to Randolph’s Report); see also infra note 208 and accompanying text (discussing the writ
of ne exeat).
36
Thus, Taylor and Willis described Randolph’s proposed amendment as “of much more limited
scope . . . , inasmuch as it operated only upon the district courts, applied only to judgments at law . . . ,
and was merely procedural in purpose.” Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1171 n.14. Similarly, Wythe
Holt acknowledges the similarity, but contends that Randolph’s provision was part of a larger scheme
designed to separate the state and federal courts and immunize state court judgments from Supreme
Court review. See Holt, supra note 23, at 336 n.145.
37
For the view that the continuing availability of federal writs of certiorari highlights the
narrowness of the AIA restriction, see Mayton, supra note 5, at 336 (citing Note, Federal Court Stays of
State Court Proceedings: A Re-examination of Original Congressional Intent, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 612,
620–23 (1971) (describing both the Morris certiorari and a similar writ issued to the South Carolina
state court in Washington & Beresford v. Huger)).
38
See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 202 n.9.
39
See infra Part II.B–C.
40
See Allen v. Morris & Nisbitt, Minute Docket, 1787 and 1795–1796, Chowan County Court of
Pleas and Quarter Sessions, North Carolina Office of Archives and History (entries for Mar. 29, 1787
and June 28, 1787), Chowan County [hereinafter Chowan County Minutes] (on file with authors).
35
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II. MORRIS V. ALLEN: THE FIRST INTERJURISDICTIONAL CLASH
The Morris certiorari case, Morris v. Allen, grew out of a longsimmering dispute between Robert Morris, the “Financier of the American
Revolution,”41 and a group of merchants in Edenton, North Carolina.42 The
litigation,43 which has been the subject of a detailed and extremely helpful
historical treatment,44 went through four phases. Each phase reveals
something distinctive about the perceived failure of the state courts to
provide an unbiased forum for disputes involving nonresidents and the
difficulty of fashioning a federal judicial solution to that failure. The saga
begins with what Morris regarded as a flawed state court proceeding.45 In
the second phase, Morris sought relief from a state court of equity.46 In the
third phase, Morris sought to shift his equitable proceeding to the newly
created federal court system through certiorari,47 thereby triggering phase
four: a national crisis in federal–state judicial relations. By situating the
dispute in the complex world of late eighteenth-century commercial
litigation, we hope to shed light on the meaning of the AIA. We start with a
brief overview of the dispute.
A. Phase One: Morris and the North Carolina Jury
Robert Morris was a man of wealth and repute in the early republic.48
He was Superintendent of Finance under the Articles of Confederation, one
41

ELLIS PAXSON OBERHOLTZER, ROBERT MORRIS: PATRIOT AND FINANCIER 1 (1903).
See Chowan County Minutes, supra note 40.
43
The legal battle that pitted Robert Morris and his Philadelphia associates David Conyngham
(alternatively spelled “Cunningham”), Redmond Conyngham (or “Cunningham”), and John Nesbitt
against Nathaniel Allen and a group of Edentonian merchants took on a variety of case names as it
wound its way through the North Carolina state courts. For example, the original state court action at
law was docketed under Allen v. Morris & Nisbitt and Allen v. Nesbit. See Chowan County Minutes,
supra note 40. For simplicity and in the interest of remaining consistent with the DHSC’s manner of
indexing this litigation, see generally DHSC, supra note 9, we refer to all of these proceedings in state
and federal court as “Morris v. Allen.”
44
See generally Holt & Perry, supra note 5 (examining the Morris dispute). We are indebted to
Professor Holt and Mr. Perry for their meticulous archival research.
45
See infra Part II.A.
46
See infra Part II.B.
47
See infra Part II.C.
48
See BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF AMERICAN
INDEPENDENCE 202–05, 207 (2002); JOHN R. VILE, 1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A
COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 218 (2005). Morris and his good friend,
future Justice James Wilson, had speculated in land, and when the speculative bubble burst in the late
1790s, both men found themselves in debtors’ prisons. See MANN, supra at 203, 207; William Ewald,
James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 908 (2008). Morris
bears the distinction of being (along with Wilson) one of two men to have signed the Declaration of
Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the U.S. Constitution. MICHAEL E. NEWTON, ANGRY
MOBS AND FOUNDING FATHERS: THE FIGHT FOR CONTROL OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 77 (2011);
see also VILE, supra, at 209; The Declaration of Independence: A Transcription, ARCHIVES.GOV,
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2013). Some
42
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of Pennsylvania’s delegates to the constitutional convention, and later a
U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania.49 During the 1780s, Morris found himself
embroiled in a series of disputes with his former business associates in the
North Carolina state courts. The suits involved creditors’ claims filed
against Morris’s North Carolina assets—assets that had been managed by
one Robert Smith.50 When Smith died suddenly in March 1782, executors
were called upon to conduct an accounting of his disorderly estate.51 The
first suit, filed by John Cooper in June 1782, alleged that Morris owed
debts of £2800, but a “special” North Carolina jury comprised entirely of
merchants awarded Cooper an amount more than triple the claimed debt.52
James Iredell, one of the executors of the Smith estate,53 was surprised by
the sum and observed that Morris’s attorney, future Senator Samuel
Johnston, would “make a motion in arrest of Judgme[nt], conceiving the
proceedings in the conduct of the suit to have been irregular.”54 The motion
was discontinued and the parties settled in the spring of 1785.55 Morris’s
decision to settle appears to have been prompted both by the difficulties of
defending against an action in a distant court and by an expectation that, as
an outsider, he would not get a fair shake in North Carolina state court.56
historians regard Morris as having been “the most powerful man in America—aside, perhaps, from
George Washington.” TERRY BOUTON, TAMING DEMOCRACY: “THE PEOPLE,” THE FOUNDERS, AND
THE TROUBLED ENDING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 72 (2007); see also CHARLES RAPPLEYE,
ROBERT MORRIS: FINANCIER OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 4 (2010).
49
OBERHOLTZER, supra note 41, at 58, 74.
50
See generally Complaint at 252–84, Morris v. Allen, Record of the Pleadings and Decrees in the
Court of Equity, Superior Court of Law and Equity for Edenton District, North Carolina Office of
Archives and History (1788) [hereinafter Complaint, Morris] (on file with authors); Answer of
Nathaniel Allen, John Maxwell Nesbitt, and David Hayfield Cunningham at 285–92, Morris v. Allen,
Record of the Pleadings and Decrees in the Court of Equity, Superior Court of Law and Equity for
Edenton District, North Carolina Office of Archives and History (1788) [hereinafter Answer, Morris]
(on file with authors); Pleading of Josiah Collins and James Iredell at 293–98, Morris v. Allen, Record
of the Pleadings and Decrees in the Court of Equity, Superior Court of Law and Equity for Edenton
District, North Carolina Office of Archives and History (1788) [hereinafter Collins & Iredell Pleading,
Morris] (on file with authors); see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 90–91.
51
See Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 91, 112 n.6.
52
Id. at 91, 113 n.8.
53
Iredell, a North Carolina lawyer and Federalist, and later a Justice of the Supreme Court, found
himself ensnared in the Morris affair as an executor of the Smith estate. See Letter from James Iredell,
Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, to John Jay, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and William
Cushing and James Wilson, Assoc. Justices of the Supreme Court (Feb. 11, 1791), in 2 DHSC, supra
note 9, at 131, 134.
54
Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 91, 113 n.8 (alteration in original) (quoting a letter from Iredell to
Conyngham, Nesbitt & Co. dated January 3, 1784). Iredell did not specify the nature of the
irregularities. Id. at 91–92.
55
Id. at 92.
56
See id. at 92–93, 113 n.13 (quoting a letter to Morris from his attorney, Samuel Johnston, dated
April 1, 1785, stating that “it would have been much against you to defend a Law Suit at so great a
distance from home against an Adversary on the Spot ready to avail himself of every favorable
occurrence”). Before settling the Cooper matter, Morris complained that he had been “the Subject of

196

108:187 (2014)

The Lost History of the Anti-Injunction Act

The second suit arose from a shipping venture gone awry. Morris and
three other Pennsylvanians held a one-third interest in the cargo vessels
Hancock and Franklin; nine merchants from Edenton, North Carolina, held
the remaining two-thirds interest.57 One of the Edentonians, Nathaniel
Allen, was named “[s]hip’s husband,” with sole authority to give orders as
to cargo contents and ports of call.58 Morris was concerned that the ships,
which were based in Edenton, might be vulnerable to British attack because
the port of Edenton was “particularly infested by Cruizers of the Enemy.”59
Morris convinced Allen that the ships “might be sent upon voyages of
much greater profit and safety” if they set sail from Philadelphia instead of
Edenton.60 He maintained that Allen ordered the ships to rendezvous at
Philadelphia, “to be placed under the care controul and management” of
Morris.61 (Allen later claimed that he had “signified his disapprobation of
that part of the plan which had in view the return of the vessels to the port
of Philadelphia.”)62 In January 1782, both vessels set sail from Philadelphia
for foreign ports with orders from Morris to return to Philadelphia.63 On the
return voyage, British ships seized the fully laden Hancock; the Franklin’s
captain, ostensibly fearing the same fate, disobeyed Morris’s orders and
returned to Edenton instead.64 Armed with profits from the Franklin’s
successful return, the Edentonians pursued Morris and his associates on the
theory that, in contravening Allen’s instructions that both ships return to
Edenton, Morris had caused the loss of the Hancock.65
As luck would have it, Allen was also a North Carolina state court
judge. Judge Allen and his fellow Edentonians brought their action against
Morris and his Philadelphia business partners in 1786 in North Carolina’s
Chowan County Court of Pleas and Quarter Sessions—the same court in
which Allen served as judge.66 In keeping with the vicinage rules of the
day, Morris’s jury would have been composed of individuals drawn from

abuse & misrepresentation in No. Carolina on Acct. of this affair.” Id. at 92, 113 n.12 (quoting a letter
from Morris to John Williams, dated November 23, 1784).
57
See Complaint, Morris, supra note 50, at 252–53; see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 90, 112
n.4.
58
Answer, Morris, supra note 50, at 286; see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 90.
59
Complaint, Morris, supra note 50, at 255.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Answer, Morris, supra note 50, at 287–88.
63
See Complaint, Morris, supra note 50, at 254–55; see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 91, 112
n.5.
64
Complaint, Morris, supra note 50, at 263–64; Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 91, 112 n.5.
65
Answer, Morris, supra note 50, at 288–89; Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 91.
66
See Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 93. Holt and Perry observe that although Judge Allen
apparently did not sit on the days Morris’s case was heard, “it is reasonable to conclude that [Allen’s]
fellow judges might favor the interests of the North Carolinian.” Id. at 93, 113 n.14 (citing Chowan
County Minutes, supra note 40).
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the local community.67 In June 1787, the Edentonians prevailed with a jury
verdict of £2775,68 resulting in what we will sometimes call the Hancock
judgment. At the time, Morris was in Philadelphia attending the
Constitutional Convention as a representative of the state of Pennsylvania.69
Based on his experience in North Carolina, Morris may well have
supported the efforts of his fellow Pennsylvania delegate, James Wilson, to
provide in Article III of the Constitution for a set of independent federal
tribunals with diversity jurisdiction over disputes between locals and the
citizens of another state.70
67

Common law practice in the early republic adhered to the “vicinage principle,” wherein juries
were “drawn from the immediate vicinity, or vicinage, of the area in which the cause of action arose”
because “[o]nly a local jury . . . would be in a position to judge the credibility and motives of the parties
and witnesses.” Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997, 1003, 1070 (2007).
Vicinage was of such importance that debates over its rejection arose in the ratifying conventions
of several states, including North Carolina, with Antifederalists supporting vicinage. See id. at 1038,
1073. Compare Joseph M’Dowall, Remarks at the Convention of the State of North Carolina on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (July 28, 1788), in 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 149–51 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 1891) [hereinafter DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS] (“Suppose
a crime is committed at the Mississippi; the man may be tried at Edenton. They ought to be tried by the
people of the vicinage; for when the trial is at such an immense distance, the principal privilege
attending the trial by jury is taken away; therefore the trial ought to be limited to a district or certain
part of the state.”), with Governor Samuel Johnston, Remarks at the Convention of the State of North
Carolina on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, in 4 DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS,
supra, at 150 (“We may expect less partiality when the trial is by strangers; and were I to be tried for
my property or life, I would rather be tried by disinterested men, who were not biased, than by men who
were perhaps intimate friends of my opponent.”).
Moreover, as was customary, these local jurors would have wielded the power to decide issues of
both law and fact subject to minimal bench control. See Jones, supra, at 1031; William E. Nelson,
Politicizing the Courts and Undermining the Law: A Legal History of Colonial North Carolina, 1660–
1775, 88 N.C. L. REV. 2133, 2146 (2010) [hereinafter Nelson, Politicizing the Courts] (footnote
omitted) (“Judges [in colonial North Carolina], even in chancery, always relied on juries to assess
damages, and juries passed on legal issues, such as the validity of service of process, that were more
appropriately raised with the court prior to trial.”). But see William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of
Colonial American Juries, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1003, 1025 (2010) [hereinafter Nelson, Lawfinding Power]
(finding that North Carolina judges exercised control over jury lawfinding). Professor Jones argues that
diversity jurisdiction has its roots in the Framers’ “desire to circumvent state court juries” whose
“almost unfettered power to decide legal controversies” constituted a “direct, and therefore dangerous,
form[] of democracy.” Jones, supra, at 1003–04.
68
See Trial, Appearance, and Reference Docket, Allen v. Morris & Nesbitt, Chowan County Court
of Pleas and Quarter Sessions, North Carolina Office of Archives and History (entry for June 1787),
Chowan County [hereinafter Chowan County Trial Docket] (on file with authors); see also Holt &
Perry, supra note 5, at 92, 113 n.10.
69
The records of the Convention report that Robert Morris attended as a delegate from
Pennsylvania from the convention’s opening day in May 1787 to the date on which he added his
signature to the document in September 1787. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 1 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); 2 id. at 664.
70
See Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 95; James Wilson, Remarks at the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Dec. 7, 1787), in 2 DEBATES IN THE STATE
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B. Phase Two: Equitable Relitigation in State Court
Again finding himself in North Carolina state court, Morris moved
along two separate tracks to block enforcement of the Hancock judgment
against him. First, he filed a petition for a writ of error with the North
Carolina Superior Court of Law, seeking review of the jury’s verdict.71
Second, and somewhat surprisingly to a modern observer, he filed a bill in
equity seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the jury verdict.72 Today, in a
court system where law and equity have merged, one would expect Morris
to litigate all of his claims and defenses in the first proceeding, and then to
seek direct review of the final judgment in an appellate court. Under the
doctrine of claim preclusion, such a judgment would preclude a second or
collateral round of litigation. By contrast, in the 1780s the English court
system and many colonial and early state court systems in America
separated the courts of law and equity and did not regard judgments at law
as a bar to a second proceeding in equity; this absence of res judicata effect
was the essence of a divided regime where courts of equity entertained
claims and defenses unavailable in courts of law.73 As a result, litigants in
CONVENTIONS, supra note 67, at 491–92 (“[I]s it not necessary, if we mean to restore either public or
private credit, that foreigners, as well as ourselves, have a just and impartial tribunal to which they may
resort? I would ask how a merchant must feel to have his property lie at the mercy of the laws of Rhode
Island. I ask, further, How will a creditor feel who has his debts at the mercy of tender laws in other
states?”). This stands in stark contrast to Judge Henry Friendly’s assertion that there is no evidence of
state court bias to justify constitutional provisions for diversity jurisdiction. See Henry J. Friendly, The
Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 493 (1928) (“But such information as
we are able to gather from the reporters entirely fails to show the existence of prejudice on the part of
the state judges.”).
Several years later, during a debate to repeal the Midnight Judges Act of 1801, Morris would ask
his fellow Senators to “[e]xamine the annals of history” and “see what has been the ruin of every
Republic”—“[t]he vile love of popularity.” He asked, “Why are we here? To save the people from their
most dangerous enemy; to save them from themselves.” 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 41 (1802); see also
Jones, supra note 67, at 1037 & n.186.
71
See Answer, Morris, supra note 50, at 288–89 (“[A]n attachment hath been levied on the monies
of the Complainants [Morris et al.] in the hands of Robert Smith’s Executors, and . . . the same hath
been removed by Appeal on the part of the Complainants to the Superior Court of Law for the said
District, altho’ this Defendant [Nathaniel Allen] and the other Plaintiffs in the said suit have prevailed
in two trials in the said County Court.”).
72
See Complaint, Morris, supra note 50; Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 92, 113 n.11.
73
See Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 332, 336 (1813) (“Without attempting to
draw any precise line to which Courts of equity will advance, and which they cannot pass, in restraining
parties from availing themselves of judgments obtained at law, it may safely be said that any fact which
clearly proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could
not have availed himself in a Court of law; or of which he might have availed himself at law, but was
prevented by fraud or accident unmixed with any fault or negligence in himself or his agents, will
justify an application to a Court of Chancery.”); GEO. TUCKER BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
§ 380, at 331–32 (Joseph D. McCoy rev. ed., 11th ed. 1931); 1 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 378, at 601–03 (2d ed. 1902); see also infra Part III.C. Similarly, a
judgment in equity was not res judicata as to a proceeding at law. 28 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2,
§ 4410, at 253 (generally acknowledging the absence of res judicata effect as between law and equity as
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complex or high-stakes disputes often conducted two rounds of litigation:
one in the courts of law for breach of contract or other claims and a second
proceeding in the court of equity to press claims of an equitable nature.74
Morris’s invocation of equity after suffering an adverse ruling at law
was hardly a novel strategy. Rules of equity dating back to Lord Coke’s
feud with Chancellor Ellesmere in 1616 held that a litigant could invoke
the equity or conscience of the Chancellor with allegations of fraud,
mistake, unconscionability, or accident.75 Moreover, courts of equity
typically made available depositions and other tools of discovery
unavailable at common law that could justify a litigant’s invocation of
equitable jurisdiction.76 Sometimes, equitable proceedings ran alongside the
action at law, performing a supplemental function.77 But often, the party
invoking equitable jurisdiction would claim that fraud or mistake vitiated a
contract that would have been regarded as binding at common law.78
a historical matter and observing that “a first proceeding at law or in equity often could be followed by
a second proceeding in equity or at law”). For an early English case illustrating the refusal of law courts
to take notice of decrees in equity, see infra note 261.
Collateral estoppel was a different matter. Courts of equity routinely decided questions of fact—
normally the province of law courts (and juries)—and their findings could enjoy issue-preclusive effect
in subsequent actions at law. See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959)
(declaring that the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury cannot be lost through a prior
determination of common factual issues in an equitable claim); Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. (1 Cranch) 109,
113–14 (1821).
74
See Nelson, Politicizing the Courts, supra note 67, at 2141, 2145–48.
75
See 1 BLACK, supra note 73, § 356, at 561–62; 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *330
(writing that the decision on “whether a court of equity could give relief after or against a judgment at
the common law” came “by the royal prerogative in favor of the court of chancery, of the dispute set on
foot by Sir Edward Coke”); GEORGE COOPER, A TREATISE OF PLEADING ON THE EQUITY SIDE OF THE
HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY *xxviii, *8 (New York, Riley 1813); 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A
TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1360, at 973 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941) (“The use
of injunctions to stay actions at law was almost coeval with the establishment of the chancery
jurisdiction.”); 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 51, at 55 (W.H. Lyon, Jr., ed., 14th ed. 1918); 2 id. § 1197, at 562 (noting
the importance of equity to interpose in cases of “accident, mistake, and fraud” and to provide
discovery “which a Court of Law cannot grant”).
76
See BISPHAM, supra note 73, § 380, at 331 (“It is well established that equity will interfere to
restrain proceedings at law wherever through . . . want of discovery one of the parties in a suit at law
obtains, or is likely to obtain, an unfair advantage over the other, so as to make the legal proceedings an
instrument of injustice.”); id. § 385, at 336 (“[W]here one of the parties to a common-law action desires
to obtain discovery from his adversary, the jurisdiction of a Court of Chancery will be exercised to
restrain the other party from proceeding with the action until discovery is obtained.”); 2 STORY, supra
note 75, § 877, at 255.
77
See 1 STORY, supra note 75, §§ 116–17, at 116–17 (describing the concurrent jurisdiction of
courts of equity).
78
See 1 HENRY MADDOCK, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT
OF CHANCERY *111 (New York, Clayton & Kingsland 1817) (“It is a general rule . . . that wherever a
party by fraud, accident, or otherwise, has an advantage in proceeding in a court of ordinary
jurisdiction, which must necessarily make that court an instrument of injustice, a court of equity, to
prevent a manifest wrong, will interpose, by restraining the party whose conscience is thus bound, from
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Hence, courts of equity exercised the power to stay proceedings at law or to
enjoin the enforcement of common law judgments.79 This injunctive power
knew no temporal limits—courts of equity were free to interpose at any
time, whether to stay trial, to stay enforcement of a judgment, to stay
execution of a judgment, to prevent assignment of a judgment, or even “to
stay the money in the hands of the sheriff” following execution of a writ of
fieri facias.80
Applications for writs of injunction to stay proceedings at law could
thus result in the virtual relitigation of the dispute, an unusual consequence
when viewed through the modern lens of res judicata. To be sure, the
eighteenth-century lawyer did not necessarily conceive of equity as a mode
of pure relitigation.81 Common law courts did not take cognizance of
equitable defenses, thus distinguishing the two proceedings in formal
terms.82 But as a practical matter, the initiation of a claim in equity could,
with allegations of fraud or mistake, trigger a second round of litigation.
using the advantage he has improperly gained.”); 1 STORY, supra note 75, § 29, at 26 (describing
injuries in which “Courts of Equity will interfere and grant redress, but which the common law takes no
notice of or silently disregards”).
79
See BLACK, supra note 75, § 356, at 561–62 (describing the origins of the power of courts of
equity to enjoin the enforcement of judgments at law); ROBERT HENLEY EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 14 (Jacob D. Wheeler ed., 2d ed. New York, Gould, Banks & Co. 1839) (“[I]t has
become one of the most ordinary modes of equitable interposition to afford relief by Injunctions to stay
proceedings at law.”); 1 SAMUEL TURNER, THE PRESENT PRACTICE AND COSTS OF THE HIGH COURT OF
CHANCERY 368–69 (Robert Venables ed., 5th ed. London, W. Flint 1817) (footnote omitted) (“The
Writs of Injunction are made out by the Clerk in Court, the Orders being left with him, and must be
served personally on the Defendant, his Solicitor, and Attorney. If the Defendant, or his Attorney,
afterwards proceed in the Cause at Law, contrary to the Direction of the Writs, it will be a Contempt of
Court, which the Court will punish on Application by Motion for that Purpose . . . .”); WOODDESSON,
supra note 16, at 162 (recognizing the commonplace quality of the injunction to stay proceedings at law
and its broad application); WYATT, supra note 18, at 232 (“Where it is prayed to stay proceedings, it is
commonly upon some matter suggested in the bill; as that the complainant is not able, for some reasons
shewn, to make his defence in the other court; though he hath a good discharge here in equity . . . .”).
80
BISPHAM, supra note 73, § 380, at 331; see 7 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT AND
DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 618 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1824) (“An injunction may stay
trial, or verdict, or judgment, or execution, or money levied thereon in the officer’s hands.”); 1
MADDOCK, supra note 78, at *109 (footnote omitted) (recognizing that injunctions to stay proceedings
at common law may be “used to stay trial, or after a verdict to stay judgment, or after a judgment, to
stay execution, or proceedings under an execution; or if execution has taken place, to stay the money in
the hands of the sheriff”); WOODDESSON, supra note 16, at 162; WYATT, supra note 18, at 251.
81
Indeed, early treatises are quick to explain that the equitable power did not constitute an
unrestrained license to intervene with law-court proceedings and judgments. Rather, equitable
jurisdiction would typically attach under particular circumstances: fraud, mistake, accident, or
unconscionability; where parties through no fault of their own were unable to present at trial defenses
only available in equity; where the more limited availability of discovery in courts of law (as compared
to equity, where discovery was readily available) would work an injustice; or where necessary to
protect equitable rights. See BISPHAM, supra note 73, §§ 380, 383–84, at 331, 334–35; BLACK, supra
note 73, § 365, at 577–78; 3 STORY, supra note 75, §§ 2042–44, at 590–92.
82
See 1 STORY, supra note 75, § 25, at 22–23 (distinguishing legal rights and remedies from
equitable ones).
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Professor William Nelson highlighted this feature of equitable practice in
his study of colonial North Carolina.83 As Nelson explained:
[A]ppeals to Chancery . . . were possible and frequent and could result in
reconsideration of all aspects of a case. . . . [North Carolina] offered a set of
dispute-resolving institutions and a hope that as litigants tried different forums
they ultimately would find an acceptable one or alternatively exhaust
themselves in the process of search.84

Indeed, Nelson’s study reveals that North Carolina was more freewheeling
than other colonial courts in allowing equitable relitigation. Unlike, say,
South Carolina, the courts of North Carolina did not strictly adhere to the
English limits on equity and as a consequence, relitigation in equity was a
common occurrence.85 Thus a North Carolina court sitting in equity
resembled an appellate court of general jurisdiction.86 Couple this wideranging relitigation authority with equity’s traditional reliance on judicial
(as opposed to jury-based) fact-finding, and one can quickly understand
why supporters of the common law right to trial by jury may have viewed
equity with some suspicion.
The bill of complaint that Morris filed in 1788 to trigger equitable
relitigation of the Hancock dispute with Allen and the Edentonians is
revealing.87 Sure enough, the bill recited in great detail the circumstances
surrounding the capture of the vessel, the prior litigation, and the entry of
the judgment at law in favor of the Edentonians.88 It went on to identify two
bases for equitable intervention: Morris alleged a fraudulent conspiracy
between the plaintiffs at law and two of his co-defendants at law (Iredell
and Collins); he also sought discovery.89 Morris further added the
traditional allegation that remedies at common law were inadequate.90 His
83

Nelson, Politicizing the Courts, supra note 67, at 2147–48.
Id.
85
Id. at 2141, 2147–48. Professor Nelson’s study of Carolina colonial courts has revealed that
whereas South Carolina’s bench and bar were well versed in the common law, “[i]n a sense, North
Carolina had no law.” Id. at 2141, 2146–48.
86
See id. at 2145 (explaining that only rarely “did the Court of Chancery act as an equity court with
limited jurisdiction rather than a court of appeals broadly empowered to hear any case brought to its
attention”). Other states had been equally freewheeling during the colonial era. See Oliver Perry
Chitwood, Justice in Colonial Virginia, in 23 JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORICAL
AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 48 (J.M. Vincent, J.H. Hollander & W.W. Willoughby eds., 1905) (reporting
that in colonial Virginia, anyone wronged by a decision at common law could seek a rehearing in
chancery, albeit one heard before the same judges).
87
See Complaint, Morris, supra note 50.
88
See id.
89
See id. at 265, 268–69.
90
See id. at 268. Morris also sought something in the nature of an accounting from the executors of
Robert Smith’s estate, James Iredell and Josiah Collins. See id. at 281–82. Although typically treated as
an equitable remedy—mostly for fear that such complex tasks would go beyond the ken of the average
juror—the request for an accounting alone may not have been enough to warrant equitable interference
with a judgment at law. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (“As our cases indicate,
84
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state court bill of complaint identified the law-court plaintiffs by name and
prayed that
each and every of them may be restrained from proceeding at Law against
your Orators or any of them in the said suit or action instituted against them
and now depending as aforesaid in one or other of the said Courts of Law of
the State of North Carolina aforesaid by injunction of this Honorable Court.91

Under standard principles of equity, these allegations would assure
reexamination of a judgment that was also pending on appeal.92
C. Phase Three: Certiorari to Remove the Action to Federal Court
Much happened in the two years between Morris’s initiation of an
equitable action in North Carolina state court and his decision to remove
that action, by certiorari, to the federal circuit court in 1790. First, and most
obviously, the states ratified the new Constitution.93 Second, Congress
convened for its first session to legislate the new federal government into
existence.94 Among other important provisions, the congressional output of
that year included “An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United
States,” or what we know today as the Judiciary Act of 1789.95 Third, North
Carolina somewhat reluctantly agreed to join the Union.96 After the state’s
first ratification convention voted against the new Constitution, leading
Federalists (including James Iredell and Samuel Johnston) secured a second
convention at which they carried the day.97 By February 1790, President
Washington had appointed Justice Iredell to the Supreme Court98 and by

the ‘legal’ nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with reference
to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and third, the practical abilities and limitations of
juries.”); Fleming James, Jr., Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 663 (1963) (“One
reason often given for assuming equitable jurisdiction over an accounting was the difficulty of the case
for a jury.”).
91
Complaint, Morris, supra note 50, at 283.
92
See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text.
93
Ratification occurred on September 13, 1788. See Res. of Cong., Sept. 13, 1788, available at
http://memory.loc.gov/service/rbc/bdsdcc/2410h/0001.jpg.
94
Congress held its first proceedings under the Constitution on March 4, 1789. See H. JOURNAL,
1st Cong., 1st Sess. (1789), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ll/llhj/001/0000/00010000.tif.
95
Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
96
See 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 412 (1971).
97
See id.
98
See Letter from James Iredell, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, to George Washington,
President of the United States (Mar. 3, 1790), in 1 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 284
(Griffith J. McRee ed., 1949) [hereinafter MCREE’S IREDELL].
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June 1790, Congress had passed new legislation incorporating North
Carolina into the federal court system.99
The prospect of litigation in the newly minted federal courts in North
Carolina must have attracted litigants in the position of Robert Morris, who
was serving (along with William Maclay) as part of the Pennsylvania
Senate delegation to Congress.100 But the current state of the law made it
hard to see how he could shift his dispute with Allen and the Edentonians
into federal court. The jurisdiction of the North Carolina federal district
court, like other federal district courts around the country, was limited to
criminal proceedings, admiralty and maritime proceedings associated with
shipborne trade along the coast, and revenue proceedings.101 Even if
Morris’s dispute had presented a federal question, the district courts did not
have general federal question jurisdiction.102
The jurisdiction of the circuit court may have looked more promising.
These courts were to be staffed by the district court judge from North
Carolina and two of the six sitting Supreme Court Justices, whose duties
included the difficult and expensive task of riding three “circuits” to
convene courts throughout the country.103 The jurisdiction of the federal
circuit courts extended to disputes between parties of diverse citizenship,
such as that between Morris and his Pennsylvania business associates on
one side against Allen and his fellow North Carolinians on the other.104
While the diversity provision included a $500 amount-in-controversy
requirement, Morris’s dispute easily met that threshold.105 Moreover, the

99

See Act of June 4, 1790, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 126, 126 (extending the federal judiciary to North
Carolina on June 4, 1790, and providing that “the first session of the circuit court shall commence on
the eighteenth day of June next”).
100
See JOSEPH C. MORTON, SHAPERS OF THE GREAT DEBATE AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 302–03 (2006); Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 94–95. Wilson was also a
member of the Committee of Detail, which in 1787 wrote the first draft of Article III. See 1 DHSC,
supra note 9, at 118, 119 n.26. Also part of the important Committee of Detail were future Supreme
Court Justice and signer of the Morris certiorari John Rutledge, future Attorney General Edmund
Randolph, future Senator and drafter of the Judiciary Act of 1793 Oliver Ellsworth, and Nathaniel
Gorham. See id.; infra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing the role of Justice Rutledge in the
Morris affair); infra Part III.A (discussing Randolph’s role in shaping the AIA); infra note 270 and
accompanying text (discussing Ellsworth’s role in drafting the AIA).
101
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77; 1 GOEBEL, supra note 96, at 471–75.
102
The first grant of federal question jurisdiction came several years later, in the ill-fated Midnight
Judges Act of 1801. See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 127.
103
See 1 GOEBEL, supra note 96, at 471–72.
104
See § 11, 1 Stat. at 78; 1 GOEBEL, supra note 96, at 475–77.
105
See § 11, 1 Stat. at 78; Complaint, Morris, supra note 50, at 282–83 (praying for relief in the
amount of “Five thousand Pounds and upwards”).
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1789 Judiciary Act included provisions that authorized the removal of an
action in diversity from state to federal court.106
Yet the jurisdiction of the circuit court was hemmed around with
exceptions that were apparently designed to frustrate the removal of actions
like the one that Morris brought. Section 12 of the 1789 Act provided in
relevant part:
[I]f a suit be commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a citizen of
the state in which the suit is brought against a citizen of another state, and the
matter in dispute exceeds the aforesaid sum or value of five hundred dollars,
exclusive of costs, to be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court; and
the defendant shall, at the time of entering his appearance in such state court,
file a petition for the removal of the cause for trial into the next circuit
court, . . . it shall then be the duty of the state court to accept the surety, and
proceed no further in the cause . . . .107

Section 12 thus provided for the removal of actions only by out-of-state
citizen defendants sued by North Carolinians in a North Carolina state
court; it did not apply to actions like the one that Morris brought as a
plaintiff in equity, in the North Carolina state courts.108 Moreover,
Section 12 required the defendant to initiate removal by filing a petition
with the state court at the outset of the proceeding and thus appeared to
foreclose removal of pending actions.109 Morris could not rely on these
elements of the statute to perfect removal.
Nor was it obvious that Morris could shift the matter to federal court
by discontinuing (or nonsuiting) his state action and bringing a new action
in federal circuit court. To be sure, Section 11 of the Judiciary Act
conferred on circuit courts “original cognizance, concurrent with the courts
106

See § 11, 1 Stat. at 79–80 (permitting removal only at the request of defendants, for litigation
“commenced” in state court after the effective date of the statute and brought by a citizen of the state
“in which the suit is brought” against an alien or citizen of another state).
Such a phrasing of removal jurisdiction was apparently designed to preserve state court control
over all debtor–creditor litigation then pending in the state courts, even where the dispute in question
was (like the Morris case) between diverse citizens and a potential subject of federal judicial power. Of
particular concern at the time were existing state cases involving British creditor–plaintiffs. By limiting
removal to defendants only, Section 12 ensured that British plaintiffs with debt actions pending in state
court could not suddenly alight to friendlier federal forums. See Wythe Holt, John Blair: “A Safe and
Conscientious Judge,” in SERIATIM: THE SUPREME COURT BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL 155, 189 n.25
(Scott Douglas Gerber ed., 1998); see also infra note 107 and accompanying text.
107
§ 12, 1 Stat. at 79. By limiting the right of removal to defendants only, Senator Oliver
Ellsworth—chief drafter of the 1789 Act—made a “shrewd concession to Anti-Federalists.” Holt, supra
note 106, at 189 n.25. Section 12 did, however, allow removal by either plaintiff or defendant where the
parties were citizens of the same state claiming land under grants from different states. § 12, 1 Stat. at
80.
108
See Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 101 (explaining that Morris’s “case did not meet the
conditions for removal set out in Section 12 of the Judiciary Act because . . . Morris was the plaintiff
rather than defendant”).
109
See § 12, 1 Stat. at 79.
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of the several States,” of suits in law and equity between citizens from
different states.110 But unlike courts of law, which recognized an essentially
absolute right in the plaintiff to dismiss voluntarily before judgment,111
courts of equity would review applications to dismiss a bill and would deny
leave to dismiss on a showing of prejudice to the defendant.112 Thus, in
North Carolina and elsewhere, once a proceeding had reached a certain
level of maturity (comparable to what we might describe today as
“proceedings of substance on the merits”113), the plaintiff could not dismiss
as of right.114 As we will see, the North Carolina state court raised this
relative maturity as an argument against removal through certiorari, noting
that several “decretal” orders had been entered.115 In any event, it appears
that a voluntary dismissal would have occasioned the imposition of a
substantial award of costs that Morris may have preferred to avoid.116
110

§ 11, 1 Stat. at 78.
For the common law rule, permitting the plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice at any time
before judgment (nonsuit), see O’Mealey v. Wilson, (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1029, 1029; 1 Camp. 482,
482. The post-verdict right of dismissal was abolished by statute. See Price v. Parker, (1795) 91 Eng.
Rep. 163, 163 (K.B.); 1 Salk. 178, 178 (refusing to permit plaintiff to file a nonsuit after return of a
general verdict); Keat v. Barker, (1794) 87 Eng. Rep, 612, 612 (K.B.); 5 Mod. 208, 208 (same); Neil C.
Head, The History and Development of Nonsuit, 27 W. VA. L.Q. 20, 23–24 (1920).
112
This longstanding rule of English equity was carried into American practice and eventually
incorporated into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which in Rule 41 qualified the right of the
plaintiff to dismiss the action voluntarily. See Booth v. Leycester, (1836) 48 Eng. Rep. 301, 301; 1
Keen 247, 247 (refusing to permit plaintiff to dismiss bill after matter had been set for a hearing that
was likely to have led to a decree). For a restatement of the English rule, see Bronx Brass Foundry, Inc.
v. Irving Trust Co., 297 U.S. 230, 232 (1936), which confirms that a court of equity may refuse to
permit a plaintiff to discontinue the action upon a showing of prejudice to the defendants, and Ex parte
Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86, 93 (1924), which quotes Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Central
Transportation Co., 171 U.S. 138, 146 (1898), to explain that prejudice to the defendant was the
ordinary basis on which a court of equity would decline to permit the plaintiff “to dismiss his bill
without prejudice at his own costs.” See generally Head, supra note 111 (discussing the history and
development of the common law nonsuit).
113
See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975) (requiring federal courts to apply the doctrine
of equitable restraint so long as the state proceeding was initiated before the federal court had
conducted “proceedings of substance on the merits”). Notably, the Supreme Court did not apparently
draw on equity practice in formulating its rule.
114
See 89 A.L.R. 45 (1934) (“[T]he [North Carolina] rule in cases of a purely equitable nature is
that the plaintiff may submit to a judgment of nonsuit at any time before any decree or decretal order
has been made under which rights of the defendant have attached in the course of the action which he
has a right to have settled and concluded therein.”). Ostensibly, the rule guarded against abuse of the
voluntary nonsuit mechanism by plaintiffs.
115
See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
116
See Nelson, Politicizing the Courts, supra note 67, at 2189 (noting that “the [North Carolina]
county courts were hostile to outsiders, as evidenced by a court rule that ‘if any attorney’ brought
‘suit . . . in behalf of one out of the county such attorney shall be liable to pay the fees’ in the event of ‘a
nonsuit . . . [,] verdict against the plaintiff,’ or default in prosecution” (citing Order re Suits by
Nonresidents, Rowan County Court (July 15, 1755), in 1 ABSTRACTS OF THE MINUTES OF THE COURT
OF PLEAS AND QUARTER SESSIONS, ROWAN COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA 1753–1762, at 40 (Jo White
Linn ed., 1977))).
111
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For Morris, then, certiorari provided an appealing alternative. The writ
had originated at common law to enable either party to remove a pending
action—often but not invariably a criminal proceeding—from an inferior to
a superior court.117 (Today, we think of the Supreme Court’s statutory
certiorari authority as a form of appellate jurisdiction, but common law
certiorari could operate to effect the removal of an action for trial or other
disposition on the merits in a superior court.)118 As for legal authority,
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 had empowered the federal courts
117

On the origins of the common law writ of certiorari, see Weintraub, supra note 13, for a
description of the early use of certiorari in Tudor England as a writ to effect the removal of both civil
and criminal proceedings for further proceedings in a superior court. Weintraub explains that the writ
later evolved into an all-purpose tool for judicial review of administrative action. Id. at 505–16.
118
For the elements of common law certiorari, see 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF
THE LAW *349–59 (6th ed. 1793), which discusses the removal of indictments into King’s Bench for
trial and the requirement that bond be posted to ensure a relatively speedy trial after removal, and 2 AN
ABRIDGMENT OF THE MODERN DETERMINATIONS IN THE COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY: SUPPLEMENT
TO VINER’S ABRIDGMENT 1–30 (London, A. Strahan 1799) [hereinafter AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE
MODERN DETERMINATIONS], which notes the power of King’s Bench, by virtue of its general
superintendency over inferior tribunals, to remove any criminal action by certiorari. Among other
things, these authorities make clear that certiorari affects removal of the action for proceedings in a
superior court, that it applies to both criminal and civil proceedings, id. at 11 n.22 (citing Daniel v.
Phillips, (1792) 100 Eng. Rep. 1141 (K.B.); 4 T.R. 500), that the plaintiff in a civil matter can remove
his own action by certiorari, id. at 23–24 (citing Keeling v. Elliott, (1790) 94 Eng. Rep. 974; Trinity 28
Geo. 2; Barnes 399), and that a party can attempt to show cause for removal by pointing to prejudice on
the part of a local court, id. at 9, 11, 17 (citing Daniel, 100 Eng. Rep. 1141; Rex v. Cowle, (1759) 97
Eng. 587 (K.B.); 2 Burr. 834, 859; Williams v. Thomas (1782), East. 22 Geo. 3; Doug. 751 n.2). Viner
and Bacon also agree as to the proper remedy for disobedience: an attachment directed at the judges of
the inferior court. See BACON, supra, at 359; AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE MODERN DETERMINATIONS,
supra, at 17 (describing motion for attachment against lower court officer for noncompliance with writ).
One finds some disagreement in the cases on the question of what sort of showing must be made
to secure a certiorari. In some criminal matters, the writ issued as a matter of course. But in other
matters, the superior court required a showing of cause and notice to the court below. See AN
ABRIDGMENT OF THE MODERN DETERMINATIONS, supra, at 17 (citing Williams, Doug. 751, in which
Lord Mansfield ruled that the writ did not issue as a matter of course); id. at 18 (citing Rex v. Nicholls
(1785), Hil. 25 Geo. 3; 5 T.R. 280, in which the superior court quashed the writ of certiorari on the
ground that no notice had been given to the justices before the motion for a rule to show cause). Viner
also reports that a certiorari “ought not to be granted in vacation, but in open court, and upon a ground
shewn.” Id. at 9 (citing Rex v. Eaton, (1787) 100 Eng. Rep. 49; 2 T.R. 89). Even if sufficient cause were
shown at the outset, the opposing party might move to quash or supersede the certiorari. Id. at 17–18
(citing Rex, 5 T.R. 280; Williams, Doug. 751). One can probably best characterize the practice as one in
which the party moving or petitioning for certiorari makes an initial showing and secures issuance of
the writ if the superior court agrees that the petition makes out a plausible claim. The writ would
operate as a show-cause order, directing a removal of the proceedings in the absence of further
proceedings, but inviting the opposing party to move to quash if the initial writ issued in error. For
suggestions along these lines, albeit in the context of the practice of King’s Bench, see Kevin Costello,
The Writ of Certiorari and Review of Summary Criminal Convictions, 1660–1790, at 7–8 (Nov. 6,
2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), which describes a process in which the party
seeking certiorari first notified the justices of the lower court, then filed a petition with King’s Bench
along with supporting affidavits to secure removal, then served the writ on the lower court, and then
proceeded in the superior court following the certification of the record into that court.
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to issue “all . . . writs” and thus seemingly included the writ of certiorari.119
But Section 14 was qualified too: it applied only to writs “necessary for the
exercise of [the federal courts’] respective jurisdictions” and allowed courts
to issue such writs only in accordance with “the principles and usages of
law,” an apparent reference to the rules of common law inherited from
England.120 The statute thus implied that the writs in question could not
operate to confer jurisdiction on a federal court but could issue only to
secure or effectuate a jurisdiction elsewhere conferred. (Eventually, the
Supreme Court confirmed this understanding, holding some two centuries
later that the All Writs Act did not provide a freestanding source of
removal authority.)121
One could thus question the power of the federal circuit court to
proceed via certiorari on at least two grounds. First, to the extent that
Congress had foreclosed the exercise of removal jurisdiction over pending
cases like Morris v. Allen, the use of certiorari to effect removal would
appear to violate the statutory requirement that the writ issue only where
necessary to effectuate the court’s stated jurisdiction. Moreover, to the
extent that the writ operated at common law to effect removal of
proceedings from an inferior to a superior court, one can question the
power of a lower federal court to issue the writ to a state court. State courts
were creatures of state governments, needless to say, and were not made
inferior to the federal courts, except to the extent that the Judiciary Act
subjected their decisions to review in the Supreme Court. Nor did the state
court’s power to hear the Morris case depend on congressional
authorization; the state’s jurisdiction over such disputes predated the
Constitution as part of what Alexander Hamilton and others termed the
state’s primitive or preexisting jurisdiction.122
119

Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82.
Id.
121
See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002) (“Section 1441[, the removal
statute,] requires that a federal court have original jurisdiction over an action in order for it to be
removed from a state court. The All Writs Act, alone or in combination with the existence of ancillary
jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute for that requirement.”). Today’s All Writs Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006), is “the lineal successor” to the all writs powers conferred under Section 14 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789. James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to
Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1433, 1466–67 (2000).
122
For an account of Hamilton’s conception of the primitive or preexisting jurisdiction of the state
courts, and his notion that such jurisdiction would remain intact following the creation of the federal
courts under Article III, see James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191, 216–20 (2007), which
describes Hamilton’s argument in Federalist No. 82 about the presumption in favor of concurrent state
and federal jurisdiction over diversity proceedings, among others. In contrast to diversity proceedings,
one can argue that the power of the state courts to hear federal question cases depends on the
willingness of Congress to assign those matters to the states, thus providing a basis for considering the
state courts inferior to their federal counterparts. Id. at 216 (quoting Hamilton’s comment that
assignment of federal jurisdiction to state courts would constitute them as inferior tribunals within the
meaning of Article I of the Constitution).
120
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One might try to answer these doubts in various ways. If one were to
regard federal jurisdiction as mandatorily vested in federal courts, then one
might argue that the All Writs Act served to implement the “jurisdiction”
conferred in the Constitution, rather than that conferred by statute.123 A
more promising approach would be to argue that the use of certiorari serves
to implement the provision in Section 11 that gives the federal circuit
courts original cognizance, concurrent with the state courts, of diversity
matters arising in law or equity.124 On a generous interpretation, and leaving
aside the implications of Section 12 removal limits, one might consider
certiorari as serving to effectuate the Section 11 grant of original and
concurrent jurisdiction over matters brought by out-of-staters like Morris
against locals from North Carolina. Certainly, Morris’s conspiracy claims
against a group of state insiders would appear to implicate the bias-

123

The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction has been widely described as mandatory and selfexecuting. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: Early
Implementation of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1568 (1986)
(“For Attorney General Randolph and all of the [J]ustices except Iredell, federal jurisdiction was
mandatory or at least self-executing; it was neither dependent upon congressional grant nor subject to
congressional curtailment.”); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1289 n.141 (1989) (“I do not regard it as
established that, in fact, the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction was intended by the framers to be
self-executing. I do regard it as relatively clear, however, that four of the five [J]ustices in Chisholm
might reasonably have been thought by the adopters of the Eleventh Amendment to have held that
opinion.”).
The All Writs Act might be regarded as authority for the judicial recognition of writs to carry the
Court’s original jurisdiction into effect, as Justice Iredell recognized in his dissent in Chisholm. See
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 432–34 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“I conceive, that all
the Courts of the United States must receive, not merely their organization as to the number of Judges
of which they are to consist; but all their authority, as to the manner of their proceeding, from the
Legislature only. . . . The [All Writs Act] . . . provides in the following words: ‘All the before
mentioned Courts of the United States, shall have power to issue writs of feire facias, habeas corpus,
and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law.’ These words refer as well to
the Supreme Court as to the other Courts of the United States.” (emphasis omitted)). For an argument
that the All Writs Act also implements the Court’s constitutional grant of appellate jurisdiction, see
Pfander, supra note 121, at 1497–98, which observes that the Supreme Court, but not the lower federal
courts, receives its jurisdiction directly from the Constitution.
Scholars have, to be sure, occasionally argued that some portion of the jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts might also be regarded as constitutionally compelled. See Akhil Reed Amar, A NeoFederalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205
(1985). But the argument has yet to carry the day. Cf. John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit
the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (1997)
(defending the “traditional view that Congress’s authority [to limit the federal courts’ jurisdiction] is
substantial”). But whatever the merits of the argument for mandatory vesting, few would contend that it
applies to jurisdiction over disputes based on the citizenship of the parties. See Amar, supra, at 209–10
(distinguishing between mandatory jurisdiction over federal question cases and permissive jurisdiction
over diverse party controversies).
124
See § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79.
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prevention rationale most often associated with the exercise of diversity
jurisdiction.125
Unfortunately, the historical record does not reveal on what basis the
U.S. Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina issued the certiorari to
the North Carolina state court. The actual certiorari itself does not appear to
exist126 and the scant surviving correspondence provides little evidence of
the Justices’ thinking.127 We do know that three Supreme Court Justices,
James Wilson, John Rutledge, and John Blair, acting in their capacity as
circuit judges, signed the writ of certiorari in the fall of 1790.128 That in
itself seems odd; federal law provided for circuit courts to meet at specified
times, convened by two circuit-riding Supreme Court Justices and one
district judge.129 The fact that three Justices and no district judge signed the
papers tends to suggest that the certiorari was drafted by Morris’s attorney
and presented to the Justices out of court for their signatures.
Correspondence from Morris’s attorney, Richard Harison, confirms
this supposition.130 Harison made it clear that he had approached Justice
Rutledge out of court in August or September 1790 to secure both a
certiorari and a writ of injunction staying the state court proceedings.131
125

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
Based on Morris’s correspondence discussing the planned removal to federal court in
September 1790, see Letter from Richard Nichols Harison, U.S. Attorney for the District of N.Y., to
Robert Morris (Sept. 7, 1790) [hereinafter Harison Letter 1], in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 87, 87–88,
and the reaction of North Carolina Superior Court judges in November 1790, see infra note 166 and
accompanying text, we estimate that the certiorari issued during the fall of 1790. See also Holt & Perry,
supra note 5, at 103, 117 n.43.
127
We do have some evidence that the certiorari may have been issued on the fly, so to speak,
without careful consideration of opposing arguments. See infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
Moreover, we have evidence that at least one of the Justices who signed the certiorari—Justice Blair—
came to entertain substantial doubts about its propriety. He wrote to Justice Wilson, fellow signatory of
the certiorari:
I have even doubted whether a certiorari ought ever to issue, in any case, from the courts of the
U.S. to those of a State; & whether that, or any other writ, ought ever to be sent for arresting the
progress of a cause, of which a State-court has once had possession. . . . But I have never known a
Certiorari to issue, except to inferior, for calling up a record before superior judges, who have
confessed a right to control[] their proceedings.
Letter from John Blair, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, to James Wilson, Assoc. Justice of the
Supreme Court (Feb. 2, 1791), in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 126, 128; see also infra note 128 and
accompanying text.
128
See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 126, 130 n.1; see also supra note 126.
129
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
130
See Harison Letter 1, supra note 126, at 87–88; Letter from Richard Nichols Harison to Robert
Morris (Sept. 24, 1790) [hereinafter Harison Letter 2], in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 95, 98 (concluding
that the best course was to transmit the certiorari and associated papers to Morris, where he could obtain
signatures from Justices Wilson and Rutledge “who will be in Philadelphia in a few Days”). Harison
explained that this course was necessitated by the view of the Justices that “two of them should concur
in granting an Injunction when the Court was not sitting.” Id. at 98.
131
See Harison Letter 1, supra note 126, at 87 (footnote omitted) (“Judge Rutledge is now absent
upon a Tour to the Eastward, but upon his Return I shall use every Effort to get your Cause into the
126
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Justice Rutledge was reportedly willing to grant both writs, but ostensibly
demurred on the basis that the Judiciary Act extended the all writs power to
the “Court” and could not be read to empower a single Justice to act for the
court in granting writs.132 Other pieces of the historical record confirm that
the signatures were obtained out of court. During the fall of 1790, Justices
Rutledge and Iredell rode the Southern Circuit (North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia).133 Justices Wilson and Blair were then riding the
Middle Circuit (New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Virginia).134 It seems likely that the signatures of Justices Wilson and Blair
and perhaps even Rutledge were obtained while they were riding their
circuits, rather than in open court in North Carolina.135
Building on Justice Rutledge’s well-founded concern with proceedings
occurring out of court,136 one can certainly question the procedural
propriety of the writ’s issuance on the basis of the ambulatory fiat of three
Justices. For starters, three Justices do not make a circuit court any more
than does a single Justice. Congress had provided for the circuit courts to

federal Court & to procure that Justice for the concerned which may be expected from an impartial
Tribunal.”); Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 102–03. Although ex parte injunctions were certainly not the
norm, one early treatise suggests that “in pressing cases,” an injunction would “be granted upon petition
and affidavit before the bill filed” and that this was “often done in vacation.” 2 MADDOCK, supra note
78, at *174; see id. at *177–78 (explaining that injunctions normally issued only after the bill was filed
and served on the defendant).
132
See Harison Letter 2, supra note 130, at 95, 98.
133
See Judicial Administration and Organization—Organization of the Southern Circuit, FED. JUD.
CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/admin_02_14.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2013); U.S.
Circuit Courts for the Districts of North Carolina, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/
nGetCourt?cid=249&order=c&ctype=cc&instate=nc (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
134
See Judicial Administration and Organization—Organization of the Middle Circuit, FED. JUD.
CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/admin_02_13.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2013); U.S.
Circuit Court for the District of New Jersey, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetCourt?
cid=248&order=c&ctype=cc&instate=nj (last visited Dec. 29, 2013).
135
This is consistent with correspondence from Morris’s attorney, Richard Harison. See supra
notes 130–32 and accompanying text. Notably, Harison also served as the United States attorney for the
district of New York and would have doubtless attended the August 1790 Term of the Supreme Court,
held in New York City. See Harison Letter 1, supra note 126, at 87; The Court as an Institution,
SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/institution.aspx (last visited Dec. 29, 2013)
(describing the Court’s first session). Although Harison could have easily approached the three Justices,
in town for the Court’s Term, to secure their signatures, it appears that he did not obtain their signatures
until sometime later. He reported in September 1790 that he was still hoping to obtain Justice
Rutledge’s fiat when he returned from his tour of the Eastern circuit. See Harison Letter 1, supra note
126. Only after Harison realized that Justice Rutledge would not alone sign the writ did he decide to
approach more Justices, well after the August Term had ended and the Justices had dispersed on their
circuits. See Harison Letter 2, supra note 130.
136
As noted above, Section 14 conferred the power to issue all writs necessary to effectuate
jurisdiction on the courts themselves, rather than the judges who staff those courts. See Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82; supra notes 119–20 and accompanying text. The explicit
exception, granting power to circuit judges to grant writs of habeas corpus out of court, tends to prove
the rule. See Mayton, supra note 5, at 334.
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sit at specified times and places, to ensure due consideration of the issues
on the basis of open proceedings in which all could participate. Justices
who did judicial business out of court would undermine this commitment to
transparency and deliberation. One might also criticize the out-of-court
issuance of the writ on the additional ground that the opposing party was
denied notice and an opportunity to be heard on the points of law presented
by the application.137 But practice on the writ of certiorari may have
entailed ex parte issuance of the writ on a petition with supporting papers
from the moving party, followed by service of the writ on the inferior court
and opposing parties and further proceedings before the superior court.138
Perhaps then one can understand the issuance of the certiorari as a rule to
show cause aimed at initiating removal and inviting further proceedings as
needed to determine the removal’s propriety.139
One final procedural wrinkle deserves separate discussion.
Correspondence from Morris’s attorney makes clear that he meant to seek
both a writ of certiorari to effect the removal of the action, and a writ of
injunction.140 Perhaps the injunction was meant to stay the state court
proceeding and was to have issued as a writ ancillary to the certiorari, but
perhaps not. At common law, certiorari itself operated as a mandatory writ,
compelling the inferior court to certify the record to a higher court and to
137

As a further complicating factor, one of the Justices assigned to the Southern Circuit, James
Iredell, was a party to the Morris litigation and could not participate in any decision about the issuance
of the certiorari. One might suppose that the two remaining circuit judges (Justice Rutledge and District
Court Judge John Stokes) could have conducted circuit business even after Justice Iredell recused
himself. But Stokes died in 1790, shortly after receiving his nomination to the bench, and never sat with
the court. See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 107. Perhaps Morris’s attorney anticipated the inability of the
Southern Circuit to grant effective relief and approached the Justices of the Middle Circuit in order to
avoid having to wait until spring 1791 to secure the certiorari.
138
On the two-step process common to applications for such prerogative writs as habeas corpus
and mandamus, see James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First
Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 899, 919–20
& n.71 (1997), which describes the initial issuance of the writ in the nature of an order to show cause.
This served to start the proceeding, invited a reply from the respondent, and led to the issuance of the
mandatory writ. On the extension of this familiar two-step process to certiorari, see FORREST G. FERRIS
& FORREST G. FERRIS, JR., THE LAW OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES §§ 176–80, at 201–06
(1926); GEORGE E. HARRIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CERTIORARI AT COMMON LAW AND UNDER
THE STATUTES (New York, Lawyers’ Coop. Publ’g Co. 1893); and Edward Jenks, The Prerogative
Writs in English Law, 32 YALE L.J. 523, 529 (1923), which reports that although certiorari was
available as a matter of right to remove criminal matters, it came to be regarded as a prerogative writ to
be issued only in the exercise of judicial discretion based on a showing of cause.
The ex parte basis on which the Justices apparently proceeded may also help to explain why they
issued the certiorari, but did not issue the writ of injunction that Morris’s attorney, Richard Harison, had
also requested. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. Injunctive relief would bind the parties,
making ex parte proceedings especially problematic.
139
Certainly Justice Iredell was to experience the Morris certiorari less as a one-off event than as a
matter of ongoing concern that was to remain alive on the docket of the North Carolina circuit for
several months to come. See infra notes 266–68 and accompanying text.
140
See Harison Letter 2, supra note 130; see also supra note 138.
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proceed no further in the action.141 Like other prerogative writs, certiorari
was enforceable through a body attachment (contempt) directed at the
judges of the inferior court.142 In other words, the writ of certiorari, if
issued, would itself effect a stay of the lower court proceeding and would
threaten the judges with contempt if they continued proceedings in the
case.
Although Morris may have asked to stay the equity proceeding that he
was proposing to remove from state court, it seems to us likely that the
application for an injunction was meant to stay the enforcement of the state
court Hancock judgment, which had awarded damages to Allen and his
associates. It was the Hancock common law judgment that Morris was
seeking to enjoin in his North Carolina equity proceeding. The purpose of
the application for certiorari was to shift the forum for equitable relitigation
of the Hancock judgment from state to federal court. The Justices who
signed the certiorari may well have concluded that it was premature to
issue a stay of the Hancock judgment through writ of injunction. Such an
order would have been directed not to the North Carolina court of equity or
its judges but to the parties to the Hancock proceeding, in keeping with
equity’s in personam operation.143 We therefore see a fundamental
difference between the writ of certiorari, which operated to initiate the
removal and was addressed to the state court, and the writ of injunction,
which would have run against the parties and would have provided the
141

By definition, a certiorari is “[a]n extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its
discretion, directing a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 258 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). The Court of Exchequer, for example, required that
bills praying for writs of certiorari “state the proceedings which have been had in the inferior court” and
“the incompetency of that court.” 1 DAVID BURTON FOWLER, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF
EXCHEQUER, UPON PROCEEDINGS IN EQUITY 44 (London, T. Burton 1795) (emphasis added). The
King’s Bench claimed the power to issue writs to all inferior jurisdictions as part of its general
supervisory power. 1 BACON, supra note 118, at 350 (“The Court of King’s Bench has a
Superintendancy over all Courts of an Inferior Criminal Jurisdiction, and may by the Plenitude of its
Power award a Certiorari, to have any Indictment removed and brought before itself . . . .”). As
described in an early writ formulary documenting mid-nineteenth-century practice in North Carolina,
the writ itself would routinely “command” removal of the case to the superior issuing court. See
WILLIAM EATON, JR., BOOK OF PRACTICAL FORMS, WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES AND REFERENCES TO
AUTHORITIES 219 (Philadelphia, C. Sherman 1854) (“We . . . command you that the transcript of the
proceedings in the said cause, and of the record of the said judgment, . . . you send to the honorable the
Judge of the Superior Court of Law . . . so that we may have them before the Judge of the said Superior
Court . . . and further do thereupon what of right we shall see fit to be done.”).
142
See 1 BACON, supra note 118, at 359 (“AFTER the Certiorari delivered, if the Inferior Court
proceeds, where by Law it ought not, it is a Contempt, for which the Court will grant an Attachment.”).
143
3 STORY, supra note 75, § 2041, at 590 (footnote omitted) (“Equity never attempts to act upon
the Court of Law itself, and does not claim any supervisory power over such courts or the proceedings
therein. It acts solely upon the party . . . .”); 4 POMEROY, supra note 75, § 1360, at 974 (“Injunction is
the remedy which, above all others, necessarily operates in personam.”). Contrast the writs of certiorari
and prohibition, which operated not on the parties but on the inferior court itself. See BISPHAM, supra
note 73, § 381, at 333.
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procedural context in which the federal court would assess (and relitigate)
the equities of the Hancock judgment.
Precisely such a distinction seems to have informed Justice Rutledge’s
reported reaction to Morris’s out-of-court application for writs of certiorari
and injunction. Justice Rutledge reportedly said that he had “no Objection
to the Propriety of removing the Suit, or to granting the Injunction as far as
the Merits of the Cause were concerned.”144 Justice Rutledge thus appears
to have distinguished the writ of certiorari, which would serve to remove
the action, from the writ of injunction, which could call for an assessment
of the merits. The other Justices drew a similar distinction, apparently; the
limited evidence we have suggests that the Justices agreed to sign Morris’s
writ of certiorari but not the writ of injunction.145
The Morris certiorari controversy thus raised two questions. First, and
most obviously, it presented the question whether a writ of certiorari could
properly issue from a federal circuit to a state court (and whether the state
court was obliged to comply). It was that question that attracted most of the
attention in the press.146 Second, and less obviously but perhaps of more
far-reaching significance, the Morris case raised the possibility that parties
could invoke federal diversity jurisdiction (either originally or by removal)
for the purpose of revisiting a dispute that had been previously settled in a
common law action in state court.
D. Interlude: Federal Relitigation of State Judgments
Before we move to the final phase of the Morris saga, the early crisis
in state–federal judicial relations that erupted in the wake of his wellpublicized certiorari, we pause to observe the legal backdrop against which
Morris formed his litigation strategy—a strategy that may seem unusual to
modern eyes. Recall that Morris was seeking relief from an adverse state
court judgment at law—the Hancock judgment—by first resorting to the
state court (as both a defendant–appellant at law and a plaintiff in equity)
and then seeking to remove his equitable action to the federal courts
through the mechanism of certiorari. One might suppose that the obligation
of the federal courts to accord full faith and credit to state court judgments
would have precluded any federal equitable relitigation of final state court
judgments like the Hancock judgment. But such an understanding rests
144

See Harison Letter 2, supra note 130, at 95.
Although Morris’s attorney, Richard Harison, had requested both writs, see Harison Letter 2,
supra note 130 (“I am persuaded that Mr. Rutledge will join in granting the proper Writs, the most
material of which I think is the Injunction[.] The Certiorari might be deferred till the Meeting of the
Court, if it is at all necessary, which I very much doubt[.]”), there is no evidence that an injunction ever
issued, see Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 103; see also supra note 138. Such an approach makes sense
if one regards the certiorari as the first step in perfecting removal, directed to the “lower” court, and
further understands the injunction as a decree that would issue to the parties after service of process was
completed in the federal court.
146
See infra Part II.E.2 (discussing national reaction to the Morris certiorari).
145
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upon modern notions of claim preclusion—notions informed by the
twentieth-century merger of actions at law and equity into a single civil
action in which the parties are expected to resolve all related issues.147 In
the eighteenth century, by contrast, law and equity remained quite disjoint;
a judgment at law did not bar equitable relitigation of the same claim, as
the colonial history of North Carolina makes clear.148 So long as state courts
of equity were free to relitigate law-court judgments from the same state,149
nothing in the pre-AIA federal law would prevent similar relitigation in a
federal court.
In reaching this conclusion we consider both the Constitution’s Full
Faith and Credit Clause and the full faith and credit legislation that
Congress adopted in May 1790 (1790 Act).150 The Constitution governs
only the respect owed in “each state” to the judgments, records, and
judicial proceedings of “other state[s].”151 Morris did not involve
proceedings of another state. In contrast to the constitutional provision, the
1790 Act imposed on “every court within the United States” the obligation
to give “such faith and credit” to the duly authenticated “records and
judicial proceedings” as they have by “law or usage” in the courts from
which the records were taken.152 This statute thus imposed a faith and credit
obligation on the federal circuit court for the District of North Carolina in
respect of the records and judicial proceedings of the North Carolina state
courts—something that the Constitution had simply failed to address.153
Scholars debate the degree to which the 1790 Act operates merely as
an evidentiary rule for judgments or prescribes their substantive effect.154
147

See supra note 73 and accompanying text. For an account of the merger of law and equity, see
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
148
See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
149
See supra Part II.B.
150
See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
151
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Hancock judgment was not being attacked in cross-border
litigation; Morris was challenging the equities of the judgment in North Carolina.
152
We agree with those who understand the statutory provision to extend the faith and credit
obligation to federal courts. One can certainly argue that the federal courts were not bound by the
Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, but Congress presumably has ample power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to impose a “same faith and credit” obligation on federal courts. Act of
May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. at 122.
153
This omission makes sense in light of Article III’s agnosticism on the subject of lower federal
courts.
154
See Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Choice of Law: Full Faith and
Credit, 12 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 1, 39–56 (1981) (discussing the dispute over the meaning of the
1790 Act); compare, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 295 (1992) (“I am inclined to
believe that the Full Faith and Credit Act specified the effects of state statutes from the beginning.”),
with Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1206–07
(2009) (arguing that the 1790 Act “address[ed] the authentication of state judgments while leaving their
substantive effect unchanged”).
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But whatever one’s view of that question, the Act can scarcely have been
understood to have foreclosed federal equitable relitigation of state court
judgments at law, at least so long as relitigation was open in state courts of
equity. The 1790 Act required at most that the prior judgment be given the
same effect that it would have had in the court that entered the judgment.
That was the lesson of Mills v. Duryee, which held that state courts called
upon to recognize a prior judgment must “inquire in every case what is the
effect of a judgment in the state where it is rendered” and give the
judgment that same effect.155 Justice Wilson, riding circuit in 1794, adopted
the same approach in Armstrong v. Carson’s Executor.156 Armstrong, who
had won a judgment against Carson’s executor in the New Jersey Supreme
Court, brought an action in the Pennsylvania federal circuit court to recover
the debt.157 The defendant offered a plea that would not have been accepted
in New Jersey state court, had the action been brought there.158 Justice
Wilson reasoned that “[i]f the plea would be bad in the Courts of NewJersey, it is bad here” because the 1790 Act “declar[es] in direct terms . . .
that the record shall have the same effect in this Court . . . as in the Court
from which it was taken.”159
We have no evidence that the 1790 Act, which took effect some
months earlier, was discussed in connection with the issuance of the Morris
certiorari. But the mode of reasoning that Justice Wilson used in Armstrong
(and that the Court later adopted in Mills160) would have almost certainly
allowed federal courts to issue injunctions restraining state court
judgments: to the extent that state A’s courts of equity would grant
injunctions to restrain state A’s judgments at law, so too could federal court
B using its equitable powers enjoin state A’s law-court judgment. We know
that the state court of equity in North Carolina was free to restrain the
enforcement of Allen’s law-court judgment in Hancock. A federal court,
adopting the same-effect test announced in Armstrong and Mills, would
therefore enjoy similar freedom to use its equitable powers to enjoin
enforcement of the Hancock judgment. The Morris certiorari thus served to
underscore the threat to state court judgments posed by federal equitable
relitigation—a threat that the 1790 Act was not designed to address.161
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11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 484 (1813).
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 302 (C.C.D. Pa. 1794).
157
Id. at 302.
158
Id. at 303.
159
Id.
160
See David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 1584, 1647 (2009)
(footnote omitted) (“What prevailed in [Mills] . . . was the view propounded at length by Justice
Washington at circuit, and originally by the late Justice Wilson [in Armstrong].”).
161
Notably, Justice Wilson’s interpretation of the 1790 Act (as one prescribing the substantive
effects to be granted sister-state judgments) did not represent the majority view at the time. See Sachs,
supra note 154, at 1242–46 (discussing early decisions that did not embrace the Armstrong doctrine).
156
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E. Phase Four: The Certiorari and Federal–State Judicial Relations
Whatever the propriety of the writ’s issuance out of court and in the
teeth of statutory limits on removal jurisdiction, the historical record
suggests that the federal marshal for North Carolina dutifully served the
Morris certiorari on the state court.162 To the North Carolina Antifederalists
who had long opposed constitutional ratification on the basis that the
federal judiciary would “absorb and destroy” the state courts, the Morris
certiorari was surely a confirmation of their worst fears.163 What ensued
was an important early clash between the federal and state judiciaries.164
1. The Fallout in North Carolina.—Angered by the implication that
their courts were inferior to a federal circuit court and that their
proceedings were subject to midstream removal, all three judges of the
North Carolina Superior Court refused to obey the writ of certiorari.165 The
judges promptly issued a “declaration,” announcing the court’s intention to
defy the writ and outlining their reasoning:
First, Because that being a Court of original, general, Supreme and
unlimited Jurisdiction, they apprehended that as such a Court they were not
amenable to the Authority of any other Judiatory; and consequently that they
did not conceive, that the Suits and Proceedings depending before them in
their judicial Capacity, were subject to be called or taken from the said Court
of Equity by the mandatory Writ of any other Court or Jurisdiction whatever;
much less by that of a Court of Inferior and limited Jurisdiction.
Secondly, Because they conceived, that as Judges of the several Superior
Courts of Law, and Courts of Equity, within the State, they were not subject to
the Mandate of any Writ . . . .
Thirdly, that the Suit required to be certified by the aforesaid Writ of
Certiorari, is not in such a stage, or so circumstanced, as to be removable from
the said Court of Equity . . . pursuant to the Act of Congress in that Case
provided; the aforesaid Suit in Equity being now not in its first Stage, and not
unproceeded upon; but having been commenced several Years ago, and . . .
had been twice heard on solemn Argument, and several decretal Orders had
been made therein; And the Removal of the said Suit being required not at the
Instance of Defendants . . . but at the Instance of the Complainants, . . . [t]hat

To the extent that contemporaries viewed the Act as performing a mere evidentiary function, it would
have done even less to assuage concerns raised by Morris.
162
See Declaration of North Carolina Judges, supra note 14, at 111.
163
“Marcus” (James Iredell), Answers to Mr. Mason’s Objections to the New Constitution
Recommended by the Late Convention at Philadelphia (Jan. 8, 1788), in 2 MCREE’S IREDELL, supra
note 98, at 193. In this essay written under the pseudonym “Marcus,” Iredell responded to Antifederalist
concerns that “[t]he judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb and
destroy the judiciaries of the several States.” Id.; see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 97, 103.
164
See generally Holt & Perry, supra note 5 (documenting in remarkable detail this
interjurisdictional clash).
165
See Declaration of North Carolina Judges, supra note 14, at 111–12.
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this Case was therefore obviously not within the Purview of the
aforementioned Act of Congress, for removing a Cause from a State Court to
a federal Court . . . .166

The judges dispatched their declaration to the North Carolina General
Assembly.167 In an accompanying letter, the judges characterized the
Morris certiorari as a circumstance “which required . . . that they should
then surrender to the Judiciary of the United States a controuling power
over the Supreme Judiciary of this State, or refuse to comply with what
they unanimously conceived to be an unconstitutional Mandate of the
Judges of the Fœderal Court.”168 The judges wrote that they had hoped to
avoid such a “clashing between the Judiciaries of the United States” but
that “[t]he duties they owe to their Country at large [i.e., North Carolina],
and to themselves as Men” dictated noncompliance.169 In fact one of the
judges, staunch Antifederalist Samuel Spencer, had predicted just such an
interjurisdictional clash during North Carolina’s ratification debates.170 The
state’s assembly, still flush with Antifederalist sentiment, rushed to applaud
the judges’ defiance.171
Apart from the somewhat inflammatory character of the state court
reaction, one must recognize that the judges’ declaration had substantial
persuasive force. It highlighted three elements of the certiorari’s issuance
that seemed most vulnerable: (1) it sought to remove a proceeding that had
long been pending in state court and thus lay outside the scope of any
statutory grants of removal jurisdiction, (2) it was pursued by the plaintiffs,
whereas the removal statute authorized only defendants to remove, and
(3) it branded the state courts as inferior to an intermediate federal court.172
Indeed, so persuasive was the response that one of those who signed the
certiorari, Justice John Blair from Virginia, wrote an anguished letter to his
166

See id. at 111–13 (footnote omitted). The Declaration recites that the term of court ended on
“Saturday last,” or on November 13, 1790, and that the marshal delivered the certiorari during that
term, which allows us to conclude that the writ was likely served in the first two weeks of November.
See id. at 111.
167
See Letter from Judges of the Superior Court of N.C. to the Gen. Assembly of N.C. (between
Nov. 19 and Nov. 30, 1790), in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 110–11.
168
Id. at 110.
169
Id.
170
See Samuel Spencer, Remarks at the Convention of the State of North Carolina on the Adoption
of the Federal Constitution (July 28, 1788), in 4 DEBATES IN THE STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 67,
at 136 (“I have objections to [Article III, Sections 1 and 2] . . . . I would wish that the federal court
should not interfere, or have anything to do with controversies to the decision of which the state
judiciaries might be fully competent . . . .”). During the ratification debates, Spencer predicted that
“[t]here will be, without any manner of doubt, clashings and animosities between the jurisdiction of the
federal courts and of the state courts, so that they will keep the country in hot water.” Id. at 136–37.
171
See Resolution of the General Assembly of North Carolina (Dec. 15, 1790), in 2 DHSC, supra
note 9, at 117, 117–18 (“Resolved, that the General Assembly do commend and approve of the Conduct
of the Judges of the Courts of law & Courts of Equity in this particular.”).
172
See Declaration of North Carolina Judges, supra note 14, at 111–12.
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colleagues some months later, expressing his doubts as to the propriety of
the writ’s issuance.173
For all its rhetorical power, however, the state court declaration
notably failed to object to the simple fact of federal equitable relitigation of
state court judgments.174 The declaration clearly contemplated that such
relitigation was in the offing; the North Carolina court observed that the
proceeding in the state court of equity was fairly advanced and had been
the subject of several “decretal” orders.175 The judges’ declaration thus
contemplated equitable relitigation in federal court and argued that such
relitigation was improper, not because it would violate state norms of res
judicata, but because federal law did not allow the transfer of a pending
action like Morris’s to federal court through the issuance of certiorari.
2. National Reaction to the Morris Certiorari.—News of the state–
federal clash spread quickly through the republic.176 Newspapers in North
Carolina, Pennsylvania (by then, the seat of the federal government), and
Virginia printed the North Carolina judges’ defiant declaration.177 In
Richmond, Virginia, the declaration appeared under the following heading:
A copy of the declaration of the Judges of the state of North-Carolina and by
them annexed to, and returned with, a writ of certiorari, issuing out of the
Federal Circuit Court of the district of North-Carolina, commanding the said

173

See supra note 127 (excerpting Justice Blair’s letter to Justice Wilson).
Of course, North Carolina judges may have been offended by a proposed injunction, even one
aimed at the parties. While an injunction that sought in effect to relitigate a state court judgment would
not convey the same direct message of judicial inferiority as a writ of certiorari aimed at the court itself,
one must recognize that the injunction alone could have raised state judicial hackles. We are grateful to
Professor Alison LaCroix for suggesting this explanation.
175
See Declaration of North Carolina Judges, supra note 14, at 112.
176
This eruption of Antifederalist sentiment in North Carolina occurred in November 1790, barely
three months after the U.S. House of Representatives ordered Attorney General Edmund Randolph to
prepare a report “on such matters relative to the administration of justice under the authority of the
United States, as may require to be remedied” and on “such provisions in the respective cases as he
shall deem advisable.” RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 122 (quoting H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 2d
Sess. 289 (1790)); see also 2 DSHC, supra note 9, at 92 n.4. Randolph received his marching orders on
August 5, 1790, and on that same day, he contacted Justice Wilson for assistance in preparing the
Report. See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 122; RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 123 n.10; 4 DHSC,
supra note 9, at 535–36 (reprinting the letter from Randolph to Wilson). As a signatory of the Morris
certiorari, Justice Wilson was no doubt acutely aware of the fallout in North Carolina. For a discussion
of Randolph’s resulting Report and its influence on the language of the AIA, see infra Part III.A.
177
See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 112 n.1, 113 n.4; Declaration of North Carolina Judges, supra
note 14, at 112. Although the state judges issued their declaration in November 1790, newspapers
reprinted the document well into 1791. See Declaration of North Carolina Judges, supra note 14, at 112;
2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 112 n.1; see, e.g., North Carolina—In Senate, December, 1790, U.S.
GAZETTE (Phila.), Feb. 23, 1791, at 760 (reprinting a portion of the North Carolina General Assembly
resolution commending the defiance of its state judges).
174
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Judges to certify to the said Federal Court, a cause depending before them, in
the Court of Equity, for the district of Edenton.178

By mid-December 1790, an abbreviated report had reached the nation’s
capital, highlighting the state court’s concerns:
That though they were anxiously desirous, that no disagreement or
misunderstanding might take place between the Judicial Authority of [North
Carolina], and the tribunals established by the United States, concerning their
respective rights, jurisdictions and prerogatives yet they conceived it their
indispensible duty, which they owed to the citizens of the State, pursuant to
their oath of office, not to obey, or comply with, the mandate of the aforementioned writ.179

A short time later, Congressman John Steele of North Carolina sent
President Washington copies of both the declaration of the North Carolina
state judges and the resolution of that state’s assembly.180 A few days later
President Washington asked Attorney General Edmund Randolph for his
thoughts on the matter.181 On January 6, 1791, House member Fisher Ames
sent word of the case back home to Massachusetts.182
Despite the hubbub, no immediate congressional response to the
Morris certiorari was forthcoming. It was, after all, still a Federalist
legislative body; sympathies may have divided between the federal interest
in unbiased adjudication and the expressions of state umbrage.183 Senator
Robert Morris himself remained a powerful member of the Pennsylvania
delegation and a close friend of the President.184 Although Morris would

178

2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 112 n.1 (reprinting material from the Virginia Gazette, and General
Adviser dated June 1, 1791).
179
Edenton, (N.C.) November 19, from a Correspondent, PA. MERCURY, & UNIVERSAL
ADVERTISER, Dec. 14, 1790, at 3.
180
2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 130 n.1. In his letter, Steele described the North Carolina General
Assembly’s reaction as “a premeditated attempt to draw that state into a contest with the Union.” Letter
from John Steele, U.S. Representative, to George Washington, President of the United States (Jan. 4,
1791), in 7 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 181, 181 (Jack D. Warren, Jr. ed., 1998).
181
See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 130 n.1 (citing Letter from Tobias Lear, President Washington’s
personal secretary, to Edmund Randolph (Jan. 8, 1791)). President Washington’s correspondence came
barely one week after Randolph submitted his Report on the federal judiciary to Congress. See 4 DHSC,
supra note 9, at 142.
182
See Letter from Fisher Ames, Representative from Mass., to Thomas Dwight, attorney from
Springfield, Mass. (Jan. 6, 1791), in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 124, 124–25 (footnote omitted) (“Please
to mention this affair to [John Worthington, an attorney from Springfield, Massachusetts] & to my
friend [John] Hooker[, another Springfield attorney] . . . .”).
183
The first Congress was, in many ways, a continuation of the constitutional convention that gave
rise to it. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–
1801, at 3–4 (1997).
184
See RALSTON HAYDEN, THE SENATE AND TREATIES, 1789–1817, at 63 (1920) (describing
Morris’s role, along with fellow Senators Oliver Ellsworth, George Cabot, Caleb Strong, and Rufus
King, in procuring the Jay Treaty of 1794 and observing that “[f]ive more powerful men could not be
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soon signal a desire to abate the federal action and proceed in state court,
senatorial courtesy may have slowed any call to arms.185 In any case, the
Morris proceeding was fundamentally a dispute between courts and was
just getting underway; perhaps the courts would hit upon a solution.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the House had invited Edmund
Randolph to submit a report on the federal judiciary, and he would do so on
December 30, 1790—more than a month after the state court’s response
brought the Morris certiorari to national attention.186 We think Randolph’s
Report represents the first step in what was to become the AIA.
III. DRAFTING THE AIA
A. Randolph’s Report
Randolph’s Report contained a proposed judiciary bill that bore
striking textual similarities to the AIA and that would have solved the
problems revealed by Morris. These clues, combined with the fact that the
Report came so close on the heels of the headline-making
interjurisdictional clash that erupted following the Morris certiorari,
suggest that Randolph’s Report was at least in part a reaction to Morris and
that it in turn laid the groundwork for the anti-injunction provision of the
Judiciary Act of 1793: the AIA.
A few short months before the circuit court issued its controversial
certiorari in Morris, the House invited Attorney General Edmund Randolph
to prepare a report on improvements that might be made to the still-infant
federal judiciary.187 Whatever hopes House members may have harbored,
Randolph’s Report did not provide useful tools for overhauling the
Judiciary Act of 1789.188 Historians have proposed a range of explanations
for the Report’s apparent lack of impact: the complex politics of the day;
the reluctance of Congress to embrace radical reform of a judicial system
that, though regarded as a temporary expedient, appeared to be functioning
selected from the Senators of that period”); 9 ROBERT MORRIS, THE PAPERS OF ROBERT MORRIS, 1781–
1784, at xxxiii (Elizabeth M. Nuxoll & Mary A. Gallagher eds., 1999).
185
See Letter from John Sitgreaves, Judge of the U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of N.C., to James
Iredell, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court (Aug. 2, 1791) [hereinafter Sitgreaves Letter], in 2 DHSC,
supra note 9, at 196, 197 (footnote omitted) (“[W]ith respect to the Certiorari [Morris’s attorney] Mr.
[John] Hamilton informed Judge Blair and myself that Mr. Morris has desired him not to urge it further,
that as he was a Member of the Legislature of the United States, from motives of Delicacy he wou’d
rather the Cause shou’d be proceeded on in the State Court . . . .”). It is not clear why Morris’s case
remained on the federal docket until 1793 despite the state court’s refusal to send up the record. See 2
DHSC, supra note 9, at 239 n.6.
186
See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 122, 127–67. The House had requested a report on
August 5, 1790. See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 122 & n.2. North Carolina’s angry response to the Morris
certiorari came in November of the same year. See supra Part II.E.1.
187
See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 122 & n.2; supra Part II.E.1.
188
See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 122–27.
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relatively well; and continuing discontent at the state level with reforms
that would strengthen federal institutions.189 Perhaps most importantly,
Randolph had embraced reform of the circuit-riding system; his judiciary
act would have limited the Justices to their duties on the Supreme Court
and would have shifted the burden of circuit riding to the district judges.190
So long as the Court’s appellate docket remained relatively light—and the
Court as such had scant judicial business for the first few years—it was
difficult to persuade Congress of the need to relieve the Justices of the
burdens of circuit riding.191 The House referred the Report to a committee
from which it never emerged.192
Although it failed as a blueprint for judicial reform, Randolph’s
Report provides important evidence that the Morris certiorari helped to
highlight concerns with overlapping state and federal jurisdiction, thus
linking the Morris proceeding to the eventual adoption of the AIA.193
Randolph explained that his principal goal in preparing his Report was to
solve the problem of jurisdictional overlap and conflict.194 He would have
done so by demarcating certain matters of exclusive federal cognizance and
leaving the remainder within the concurrent jurisdiction of the state and
federal courts.195 As to these matters of concurrent jurisdiction, Randolph
would offer litigants a choice: they could proceed in state court and abide
189

See id. at 124–27.
See id. at 123.
191
Scholars overlook the significance of the cost factor in assessing Congress’s willingness to staff
the federal circuit courts with circuit judges and to relieve Supreme Court Justices of the burden of
riding circuit. The Justices were paid an annual salary that included an allowance for their expected
travel expenses and they had, as yet, little work to do as members of the Court. See James E. Pfander,
Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV.
1, 19–21, 48 & n.245 (2008). Congress may have understandably wished to wait until the Court’s own
docket filled before relieving the Justices of circuit duties that were, as a practical matter, their most
significant judicial assignments. The Justices’ deference to Congress on issues of reform makes a good
deal more sense when one recognizes that the issue was primarily one of ways and means. Cf. JUSTIN
CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT (2012) (expressing puzzlement as to why the Justices in the early republic tended to
defer to Congress on the issue of judicial reform).
192
See H. JOURNAL, 2d Cong., 2d Sess. 465 (1791), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ll/llhj/001/
0400/04590465.tif; RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 126 n.26.
193
See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 127. For example, in the short-lived Judiciary Act of
1801, Congress conferred general federal question jurisdiction on the lower federal courts and abolished
the circuit-riding duties of the Justices and thus took two pages from Randolph’s Report. Id. In addition,
as noted above, some scholars regard the Report as a likely precursor to the Anti-Injunction Act, which
was adopted two years later in Section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1793. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
194
See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 128–29 (stating that the “first object of this duty is to
suggest any defects existing in the judiciary system” and arguing that some “classes of jurisdiction”
must, by their nature, “shut[] out the jurisdiction of the state courts, as such, on the vital principles of
the Union”).
195
See id. at 129–31.
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the result, without any prospect of review in the Supreme Court;196 or they
could initiate their actions in, or remove them to, federal court, where the
Supreme Court would have the ultimate say about the resolution of the
case.197 (By barring federal review of state judgments, Randolph would
have left intact state court decisions invalidating federal statutes or
misapplying federal treaties.198 This potentially controversial feature of his
plan may have supplied the intellectual foundation for the arguments of
Virginia’s lawyers in such cases as Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee199 and
Cohens v. Virginia.200)
Although Randolph did not mention the Morris litigation by name, his
Report would have provided a straightforward solution to the problem
presented by the case.201 Morris chose to file in state court and would have
been obliged to abide the choice. Even if Morris were to succeed in
litigating his action in federal court, invoking its concurrent jurisdiction
over disputes between citizens of different states, Randolph’s legislation
would have barred the federal court from granting an injunction against the
enforcement of the Hancock judgment, a ruling of the North Carolina state
court. As Randolph explained in his notes on the jurisdiction conferred to
federal district courts, courts of equity frequently interposed to entertain
equitable defenses to suits that began in courts of law.202 He did not mean to
debar such equitable involvement, but he objected to “throwing the
common law side . . . into the state courts, and the equity side into the
federal courts.”203
Randolph’s concern with federal equitable interposition connects his
Report to the Morris certiorari. The Report, in turn, anticipated and may
have provided a template for the terms of the AIA as enacted some two
years later. Indeed, two textual clues suggest a strong link between
Randolph’s Report and the 1793 Act. First, the anti-injunction language in
the two documents bears a striking resemblance.204 Compare Randolph’s
196

See id. at 133.
See id. at 133–34.
198
See id. at 133.
199
See 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 346 (1816) (“It is further argued, that no great public mischief can
result from a construction which shall limit the appellate power of the United States to cases in their
own courts . . . , because congress must have an unquestionable right to remove all cases within the
scope of the judicial power from the state courts to the courts of the United States, at any time before
final judgment, though not after final judgment.”).
200
See 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 320 (1821).
201
In an intriguing development, Randolph chose certiorari as the mechanism for the removal of
actions from state to federal court, choosing the same mode for removal that Morris had attempted. See
RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 132–33, 142, 149, 153, 154, 155. Randolph’s choice nicely
confirms the understanding that the common law writ of certiorari would issue to remove an action
either for review of the proceedings below or for further proceedings on the merits in the higher court.
202
See id. at 162–63.
203
Id. at 163.
204
Part III.C explores one subtle textual difference that we regard as significant.
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prohibition (“[a]nd no injunction in equity shall be granted by a district
court to a judgment at law of a state court”205) with the language of the
1793 AIA: “nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in
any court of a state.”206 The AIA went further than Randolph urged by
prohibiting all federal interference (rather than that by specified courts) and
by applying to interference with state proceedings (rather than only state
judgments).207 But the provisions otherwise bear a family resemblance.
Second, both documents addressed the injunction in close proximity to the
writ of ne exeat—a quasi-injunctive equitable writ.208 Randolph’s Report
addressed the two writs in successive paragraphs;209 the 1793 Act combined
its treatment of both writs in Section 5.210 No wonder Professor Charles
Warren concluded that the Report was the obvious and undoubted
precursor to the AIA.211
Critics of Warren’s conclusion advance arguments that we find
unpersuasive. Taylor and Willis describe Randolph’s proposed amendment
as “of much more limited scope . . . , inasmuch as it operated only upon the
district courts, applied only to judgments at law . . . , and was merely
205

Id. at 142.
Judiciary Act of 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335.
207
The use of “proceedings” (rather than “judgments”) brought the AIA closer to the language of
the 1790 Act, which stated that the “records and judicial proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall
have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or
usage in the courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.” Act of May 26,
1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, 122 (emphasis added).
208
Black defines the writ of ne exeat as “an equitable writ ordering the person to whom it is
addressed not to leave the jurisdiction of the court or the state.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1131 (9th
ed. 2009). The writ is typically “issued to ensure the satisfaction of a claim against the defendant,” id.,
and as such is “frequently termed an equitable bail.” Id. at 1132 (quoting WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK,
HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY 21 (2d ed. 1956)). Others describe the writ of ne exeat as “an unusual
hybrid—a quasi-criminal blend of injunctive relief, indirect civil contempt and other forms of . . . civil
arrest” that, if likened to an animal species, “would probably bear the closest resemblance to the duckbilled platypus, an unusual animal . . . fittingly described as ‘one of nature’s oddest creatures, seemingly
assembled from the spare parts of other animals.’” Anthony E. Rebollo, The Civil Arrest and
Imprisonment of Taxpayers: An Analysis of the Writ of Ne Exeat Republica, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 103, 156
(2010) (quoting Susan Brown, Top Billing for Platypus at End of Evolution Tree, 453 NATURE 138, 138
(2008)).
209
See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 141–42 (paragraphs 3 and 4).
210
Section 5 reads as follows:
And be it further enacted, That writs of ne exeat and of injunction may be granted by any judge of
the supreme court in cases where they might be granted by the supreme or a circuit court; but no
writ of ne exeat shall be granted unless a suit in equity be commenced, and satisfactory proof shall
be made to the court or judge granting the same, that the defendant designs quickly to depart from
the United States; nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a
state; nor shall such writ be granted in any case without reasonable previous notice to the adverse
party, or his attorney, of the time and place of moving for the same.
1 Stat. at 334–35 (footnote omitted).
211
See Warren, supra note 4, at 347 (“[The AIA provision of the Judiciary Act of 1793] was
undoubtedly made in consequence of a report by Attorney General Edmund Randolph to the House of
Representatives, December 27, 1790, as to desirable changes in the Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . .”).
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procedural in purpose.”212 We find the first argument mystifying; the
authors must have overlooked the fact that Randolph’s proposed statute
included separate sections that would have curtailed the power of both the
district courts and the circuit courts in precisely the same terms.213
Randolph appended his explanatory note to the district court provision, but
its criticism of federal equitable interposition would surely have applied
with equal force to his proposed restriction of circuit court power.214 To be
sure, the AIA would operate more economically with a simple prohibition
against the issuance of writs of injunction without specifying a particular
court. But Randolph proposed to qualify the authority of both federal
courts.
As for the other supposed distinctions, we doubt that they disprove the
connection that Warren identified. True, the AIA applies more broadly than
Randolph’s proposed amendment. The AIA’s term “proceedings,” in
contrast to Randolph’s “judgments at law,”215 was broad enough to
foreclose equitable interposition in pending state court actions at law, in
equity, before probate courts, and so forth. What’s more, the AIA’s term
“proceedings” would prohibit interposition at any stage of the state court
litigation, rather than simply banning only a stay of “judgments” rendered
by a state court of law. In evaluating the significance of these disparities, it
bears noting that scholarly accounts of colonial North Carolina practice and
other sources suggest that the most common form of equitable interposition
was that aimed at proceedings at law.216 Moreover, the expansion of the
AIA prohibition did not alter the functional quality of the protection offered
to state courts. As we noted above, courts of equity could enjoin an action
at law at any time, from the point of the action’s first initiation (if based,
for instance, on a contract procured by fraud), to the point of judgment, and
ultimately to the point of postjudgment efforts to execute the judgment.217
Congress may have concluded that it could better capture all of these points
in the litigation process by describing them as proceedings, without setting
out to broaden or narrow the nature of the protection afforded. After all,
Randolph’s provision would appear to prohibit an injunction if, in seeking
212

Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1171 n.14 (emphasis omitted).
See RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 142 (“[N]o injunction in equity shall be granted by a
district court to a judgment at law of a state court.”); id. at 149 (“[A]nd no injunction in equity shall be
granted by a circuit court to a judgment at law of a state court.”).
214
See id. at 142, 162–63. Notably, Randolph’s proposed statute would have expanded the power
of the district courts to entertain equitable proceedings—something they lacked under the Judiciary Act
of 1789. See id. at 141–42 (“Writs of injunction in equity, may be granted by the judge of a district
court, to judgments of the said court at common law.”). It was not until 1807 that district courts came to
have injunctive powers. See Act of Feb. 13, 1807, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 418 (“An Act to extend the power of
granting writs of injunctions to the judges of the district courts of the United States.”).
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See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
216
See Nelson, supra note 67, at 2147–48; infra note 242 and accompanying text.
217
See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text.
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to block postjudgment execution, it had the effect of staying a judgment at
law, just as the AIA’s ban would block such interposition.
We find ourselves equally perplexed by the characterization of
Randolph’s provision as “merely procedural in purpose.”218 Randolph was
not proposing a merely procedural unification of law and equity at the state
level—he was rather proposing to end federal equitable relief against state
court judgments. After the merger of law and equity (achieved in the courts
of the United States through the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure),219 available remedies at law and in equity were to remain
the same, and nothing of substance was to turn on the fact that the litigant
was no longer obliged to pursue equitable relief in a “separate” court.220
One can readily see the potential for what we might today term outcomedeterminative (that is, “substantive”) differences in the legal rules that state
and federal courts would apply in that pre-Erie world.221 As the Morris case
made clear, splitting a case into law and equity was one thing, but dividing
it between state and federal courts was quite another.
B. The Adoption of the AIA
The AIA was enacted two years after the Randolph Report as part of
the Judiciary Act of 1793,222 legislation that would respond in part to the
Justices’ concerns with the burden and expense of circuit riding.223
Although the Justices sought radical relief in the form of an elimination of
their circuit duties (along the lines set forth in the Randolph Report),
218

Taylor & Willis, supra note 2, at 1171 n.14.
FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
220
See FED. R. CIV. P. 2 advisory committee’s notes (1937). For merger background, see Polly J.
Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747, 811–17 (1998), which
describes the merger of law and equity, beginning with the Field Code in 1848 and culminating in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
221
As early as 1792, Congress conferred power on the Court to promulgate rules of equity; the
Court responded by declaring the equitable jurisprudence of England as applicable in the United States.
See An Act for Regulating Processes in the Courts of the United States, and Providing Compensations
for the Officers of the Said Courts, and for Jurors and Witnesses (Process Act of 1792), in 4 DHSC,
supra note 9, at 182, 182 (allowing federal courts to adopt equity procedures “according to the
principles, rules and usages which belong to Courts of equity . . . as contra-distinguished from Courts of
common law . . . .”); Minutes of the Supreme Court (Aug. 8, 1792), in 1 DHSC, supra note 9, at 169,
203 (proclaiming that the Court would henceforth “consider the practice of the Courts of Kings Bench
and of Chancery in England as affording outlines” for its practice).
Speaking for the Court in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), Justice Frankfurter
held that suits brought in equity were nonetheless subject to state statutes of limitation. Professor
Collins has argued that Justice Frankfurter “dismissed a long line of precedent that suggested a different
view of federal equitable power” and instead used Guaranty Trust as an opportunity to limit the use of
federal equitable injunctions as “a means of suppressing labor strikes.” Kristin A. Collins, “A
Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts,
60 DUKE L.J. 249, 336–43 (2010).
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Judiciary Act of 1793, Ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334–35.
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Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 333–34.
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Congress was unwilling to go quite that far.224 Instead, Congress reduced
the number of circuit courts and declared that a circuit court would consist
of a district court judge and a single Justice, rather than two Justices as
specified in the Judiciary Act of 1789.225 These reforms alone cut the
burden of circuit riding (for Justices) by more than half.
Other elements of the Act were aimed at filling gaps and addressing
concerns associated with the advent of two-judge circuit courts. For
example, the Act provided for certification of questions of law to the
Supreme Court in cases where the two judges disagreed.226 In addition,
Section 5 of the Act broadened the power of the circuit Justices to issue
certain kinds of writs “out of court” that they had previously been
authorized to issue only when acting as a court.227 This was, recall, the
feature of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (with all writs power generally vested
in courts but not judges) that had led Justice Rutledge to question his power
to issue writs of certiorari and injunction on his own fiat in the Morris
case.228 The Act of 1793 authorized a circuit Justice to issue the writs of
ne exeat and injunction “in cases where they might be granted by the
supreme or a circuit court.”229 Here, Congress was acting to empower a
single Justice (but not a district judge) to grant emergency relief between
court sessions when the threat of irreparable harm might make it
inadvisable to wait until the full court could convene to hear the matter.230
Section 5’s evident concern with empowering the single circuit Justice
has misled some observers. Professor Mayton argued, echoed by Professor
Holt, that the AIA limits only the power of single Justices—power
previously conferred in Section 5—and leaves the injunctive power of
courts intact.231 It is certainly true that the AIA appears immediately after
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See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 124–27 (discussing Congress’s reluctance to radically reform the
federal judiciary); Letter from Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington, President of the
United States (Aug. 9, 1792), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS 51–52 (Walter Lowrie
& Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1834) (seeking relief from circuit-riding
duties); RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 134.
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§ 1, 1 Stat. at 333–34.
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Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 334.
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See id. § 5, 1 Stat. at 334–35.
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See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
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§ 5, 1 Stat. at 334–35.
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See Daniel M. Gonen, Judging in Chambers: The Powers of a Single Justice of the Supreme
Court, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1159, 1169–70 (2008) (citing Frank Felleman & John C. Wright, Jr., Note,
The Powers of the Supreme Court Justice Acting in an Individual Capacity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 981,
999, 1019 (1964)).
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See Holt, supra note 23, at 336 n.145; Mayton, supra note 5, at 331–32 (arguing that “Congress
in 1793 did not enact an anti-injunction statute” but instead “enacted only a law prohibiting a single
Justice of the Supreme Court from enjoining a state court proceeding”); see also RICHARD H. FALLON,
JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1030 (6th ed. 2009) (observing that Professor Mayton “marshals
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the grants of power to the circuit Justices, but it does not follow that the
general prohibition against injunctions was meant to qualify only the power
of the single Justice. For starters, the unqualified language of the AIA, “nor
shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a
state,”232 would appear to apply broadly to any injunction at the federal
level, be it issued by a court or a single Justice.
The overall structure of Section 5 confirms that its broad limitation on
injunctive power applies to both courts and judges. The Act of 1793 was
drafted to confer writ-granting power on single Justices as a supplement to
the all writs power conferred on courts in Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of
1789.233 As we have seen, that provision empowered courts to issue writs
only where necessary “for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions” and
agreeable to the principles and usages of law.234 Section 5 incorporated all
such limitations on the power to issue writs of injunction and ne exeat by
specifying that the power of the single Justice comes into play only in cases
“where they [i.e., the writs] might be granted by the supreme or a circuit
court.”235 Since the power of courts was already limited in Section 14,
similar limits would apply to circuit Justices.
The drafters of Section 5 thus plainly had the all writs power of courts
in view when they extended that writ-issuing power to circuit Justices. This
clinches the argument for treating Section 5’s limits on issuance of writs as
generally applicable to courts and judges. Consider Section 5’s restrictions
on the ne exeat power, allowing issuance of this writ only where the
complainant has commenced an action in equity and made a showing that
the defendant intended to leave the United States.236 This restriction applies
to writs granted by both courts and Justices; the statute itself recites that
sufficient proof must be made to satisfy “the court or judge” granting the
same.237 Section 5 then prohibited writs of injunction to stay state court
proceedings in terms that paralleled the ne exeat limits and apparently
applied without any limitation as to the issuing court or Justice.238 The
provision did not need to specify which writ-granting authority it qualified.
considerable support” for his view that the statute constrains only the power of a single Justice while
riding circuit).
232
§ 5, 1 Stat. at 334–35.
233
Ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82.
234
Id.
235
Ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. at 334–35.
236
Id.
237
Id. One might argue that this limit on ne exeat power was unnecessary if Section 5 already
incorporated the requirement that the writs issue only where necessary for the exercise of the court’s
jurisdiction. But notably, courts of equity would sometimes grant ne exeat before the commencement of
a suit in equity. One could argue that such a precommencement writ would be necessary to keep the
defendant from leaving the jurisdiction and would thus satisfy the Section 14 requirement that it issue in
aid of jurisdiction even though no action was pending.
238
Id.
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Nor did it need to specify that it meant to qualify the injunction-granting
power of the district or circuit courts, as Randolph’s provisions had done.239
As a general prohibition, it seemingly applied across the board to any
federal court or Justice that could exercise injunction-granting power.
C. “Writs of Injunction”
Although a variety of factors thus link the language of Randolph’s
Report to the ultimate passage of the AIA, one crucial difference separates
the two provisions. Randolph’s anti-injunction provision simply declared
that “no injunction in equity shall be granted by a district [or circuit] court
to a judgment at law of a state court.”240 The final version of the AIA subtly
modified that text, declaring instead that no “writ of injunction [shall] be
granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state.”241 Such a change may
not appear significant to the modern eye, but we think it had enormous
significance for the expected operation of the AIA. As we shall see, rules of
equity practice distinguished the “writ of injunction” (which issued
following the filing and service of an original bill of injunction) from relief
in the nature of an injunction. By forbidding only the issuance of writs of
injunction, the drafters of the AIA left the federal courts free to provide
injunctive relief as an ancillary remedy. In other words, where the federal
court first obtained jurisdiction of a cause in equity, the AIA did not limit
its power to grant injunctive relief to stay conflicting proceedings in state
court and to protect and effectuate its decrees.
1.

A Brief Primer on the Writ of Injunction to Stay Legal
Proceedings.—The distinction between original process by way of
a writ of injunction and ancillary relief in the nature of an injunction seems
to have arisen in the seventeenth century during Francis Bacon’s hitch as
Chancellor. At that point, the most common form of injunction was one
issued to stay proceedings at common law.242 Bacon understood that the
practice had been controversial with common lawyers; he had headed up
the royal commission that defended Chancellor Ellesmere’s power to stay
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See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing Randolph’s Report).
RANDOLPH’S REPORT, supra note 9, at 142.
241
§ 5, 1 Stat. at 334–35.
242
See EDEN, supra note 79, at 9–10 (“AN injunction is a writ, issuing by the order and under the
seal of a court of equity . . . amongst the most ordinary objects of which the following may be
enumerated: To stay proceedings in courts of law, in the spiritual courts, the courts of admiralty, or in
some other court of equity . . . .”); 1 TURNER, supra note 79, at 361 (“THE Writ of Injunction is granted
by the Court in various Cases, and for various Purposes: It is frequently applied for to restrain a Party
from proceeding at Law . . . .”); WYATT, supra note 18, at 231 (indicating, under the heading
“Injunction,” that such writs were issued either to stay waste or “to stay a suit in some other court, as in
a Court of Law, Court of Admiralty, an Ecclesiastical Court, or a Court of Equity”).
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Lord Coke’s judgments in King’s Bench.243 When Bacon later took over as
Chancellor, he issued a series of famous ordinances with procedural
protections designed to make the issuance of stays less controversial.244
Most relevant for our purposes, Bacon ordered that no writ of injunction to
stay a common law action was to be granted on petition or motion alone.245
Instead, Bacon required that the party seeking relief file a formal bill to
commence an action in the Chancery.246 By requiring that parties initiate an
original action by bill, Bacon guaranteed a series of important procedural
protections including service of process on the opponent (by way of
subpoena) and notice of both the allegations in the bill and the requested
relief.247
By the eighteenth century, these elements of practice in connection
with writs of injunction to stay proceedings at law had become well
established.248 Thus, in his Vinerian lectures of 1777, Richard Wooddesson
243

On the importance of Bacon’s role as the head of the royal commission, see 5 WILLIAM S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 231–38 (1966). For the text of Bacon’s report to King
James, see The King’s Order and Decree in Chancery, Cary 115, 21 Eng. Rep. 61 (1616).
244
One change was to eliminate a race to the courthouse; some Chancellors were willing to enjoin
actions at law whenever the equitable complainant was the first to file. See FRANCIS BACON,
ORDINANCES MADE BY THE LORD CHANCELLOR BACON, FOR THE BETTER AND MORE REGULAR
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE CHANCERY, in 15 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 351, 356
(James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis & Douglas Denon Heath eds., Boston, Brown & Taggard 1860)
(Ordinance 21) (“No injunction to stay suits at the common law shall be granted upon priority of suit
only . . . .”); EDEN, supra note 79, at 58 n.e (describing the prior willingness of equity to grant relief
“merely upon priority of suit” and quoting Bacon as saying “that he did not mean to make it a matter of
a horse race, who shall be first in Westminster Hall”).
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See BACON, supra note 244, at 353 (Ordinance 11) (stating that “[w]here causes come to a
hearing in court, no decree bindeth any person who was not served with process . . . , according to the
course of the court” or who did not appear).
246
See id. at 358 (Ordinance 33) (allowing suits after judgment only where the complainant puts up
a bond “with good sureties to prove the suggestions of the bill”); see also EDEN, supra note 79, at 70
(“IT is directed both by Lord Bacon’s and Lord Clarendon’s orders, that no injunction for stay of suit
should be granted or revived upon Petition.”).
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See LORD NOTTINGHAM, ‘MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE’ AND ‘PROLEGOMENA OF
CHANCERY AND EQUITY’ 46 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1965) (“The subpoena, when served, did not disclose the
cause of action and the litigation was in effect initiated by the bill setting forth the grounds of
complaint. The bill will be noticed later in connection with pleading: as to the procedure, however, the
writ was the basis of the Court’s power to compel appearance and obedience.”). Nottingham compiled
his manual during the period of his Lord Keepership, from November 1673 to December 1675. Id. at 6.
This practice continued into the early nineteenth century. See 2 JOSEPH HARRISON, THE
PRACTICE OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 540–41 (John Newland ed., London, A. Strahan 1808)
(“No injunction for stay of suit at law shall be granted, revived, dissolved, or stayed upon a petition, nor
any injunction of any other nature pass by order upon petition without notice, and a copy of the petition
first had by, or given to, the other side . . . .”).
248
A writ form entitled “The Form of a Writ of Injunction,” printed in an early eighteenth-century
English treatise, illustrates the practice:
Whereas it hath been represented unto us, in our court of Chancery, on the part of [blank space],
complainant, that he hath lately exhibited this bill of complaint into our said court of Chancery
against you the said [blank space], defendant, to be relieved touching the matters therein
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explained injunction proceedings as “those, in which the bill prays, besides
the writ of subpoena to compel the defendant to appear and answer, a writ
also of injunction, inhibiting him from suing the complainant at common
law.”249 Wooddesson went on to explain “that he who seeks an injunction,
should have a bill filed in court at the time.”250 Robert Eden’s early
nineteenth-century treatise on the law of injunctions was to much the same
effect. He explained that “[a]n injunction is a writ, issuing by the order and
under the seal of a court of equity,” which seeks among other things “[t]o
stay proceedings in courts of law, in the spiritual courts, the courts of
admiralty, or in some other court of equity.”251 Eden also explained that
practice on the writ of injunction required the complainant to file a bill, to
include a request for the writ in the bill’s prayer, and to serve the bill on the
defendant with the subpoena.252 A type of injunction called a “common
injunction” might issue, on proof of service of the bill, if the defendant
failed to answer or appear in court.253
contained; and that you the said defendant being served with a writ, issuing out of our said court,
commanding you to appear to and answer the said bill . . . ; and yet in the mean time you unjustly,
as is alleged, prosecute the said complainant at law, touching the matters in the said bill
complained of: We therefore, in consideration of the premises, do strictly enjoin and command
you the said [blank space], and all and every the persons before mentioned under the penalty of
two hundred pounds, . . . that you and every of you do absolutely desist from all farther
proceedings at law against the said complainant . . . .
Id. at 555–56.
249
3 WOODDESSON, supra note 16 (footnote omitted). This is a revised edition of Wooddesson’s A
Systematical View of the Laws of England: As Treated of in a Course of Vinerian Lectures, Read at
Oxford, During a Series of Years, Commencing in Michaelmas Term, 1777, first published in 1793.
250
Id.
251
EDEN, supra note 79, at 2, 10; see also MADDOCK, supra note 78, at *107–08 (recognizing that
chancery can stay proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts and courts of admiralty); WOODDESSON,
supra note 16, at 163 (footnotes omitted) (“And by injunction proceedings may be stayed in another
court of equity, or in the admiralty or ecclesiastical courts, as well as those of common law.”).
252
EDEN, supra note 79, at 70–71, 73–83. A money deposit was also required, where the
complainant sought to enjoin a judgment at law. WYATT, supra note 18, at 238 (“Where there is a
verdict at law, and the defendant exhibits his bill for relief, the money must be deposited before an
injunction will be granted.”).
Bills of injunction, so called, were special in that they specifically asked for injunctive relief in
their prayer, instead of asking more generally for whatever relief the court should deem just and proper.
See COOPER, supra note 75, at 13–14; EDEN, supra note 79, at 73–74; HARRISON, supra note 247, at
539 (“An injunction cannot be granted, but where it is expressly prayed by the bill; the prayer for
general relief does not extend to an injunction.”); id. at 548 (recognizing that the validity of an
injunction depends upon its being served on the defendant); 2 STORY, supra note 75, § 1183, at 553
(noting that an injunction must be “specifically prayed for by the bill”); TURNER, supra note 79, at 361
(“In order to ground the Application for the Writ, a Bill must be filed, praying for an Injunction, and
such other Relief as the Case requires.”); WYATT, supra note 18, at 233 (“Neither can [an injunction] be
granted, unless prayed for by the bill, and the prayer of general relief does not extend to an
injunction.”).
253
See EDEN, supra note 79, at 121; HARRISON, supra note 247, at 541, 543 (defining the common
injunction); 2 STORY, supra note 75, § 1215, at 571 (same); TURNER, supra note 242, at 361 (footnote
omitted) (“If the Injunction required is to stay Proceedings at Law, the common Injunction of the Court
will be granted, either for Want of an Appearance, in due Time after Service and Return of the
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Apart from this formal practice in connection with writs of injunction,
Eden also recognized that equity would, in certain specified cases, grant
ancillary relief “in the nature of an injunction” upon motion without
requiring the complainant to file a bill for a writ of injunction.254 First, he
pointed to a situation in which the court of equity had issued a decree for
the administration of assets.255 If a creditor of the estate under
Subpoena, or for Want of an Answer. If for Want of an Appearance, an Affidavit of the Service of the
Subpoena must be made . . . .”); see also 3 EDMUND ROBERT DANIELL, A TREATISE ON THE PRACTICE
OF THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 275 (London, J. & W.T. Clarke 1837) (distinguishing “common
injunctions” from “special injunctions”); EDEN, supra note 79, at 83–86 (describing four situations in
which an injunction might issue following filing and service of the bill). Thus it was possible for an
injunction to issue before the defendant’s filing of an answer, in order to preserve the status quo. See
WYATT, supra note 18, at 233 (“If it be granted before answer, it is commonly till answer and further
order.”). If the defendant answered and denied the bill’s equity, the court would dissolve the injunction
absent a showing of good cause by the plaintiff. See EDEN, supra note 79, at 115; TURNER, supra note
79, at 370; WYATT, supra note 18, at 234; id. at 242 (“If an injunction is dissolved, yet if there be cause
it may be revived on motion.”).
Although the common injunction would stay execution of a judgment, it did not absolutely bar
further proceedings at law. See HARRISON, supra note 247, at 546 (“An injunction to stay trial cannot
be had in the first instance. The common injunction must be had, and then a motion to extend it to stay
trial.”). An early English writ formulary included in Joseph Harrison’s 1808 treatise makes this clear.
The form provides that the “defendant is at liberty to call for a plea, and to proceed to trial thereon; and
for want of a plea, to enter up judgment; but execution is hereby stayed.” Id. at 555–56.
254
1 ROBERT HENLEY EDEN, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS, AND
OF INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS IN THE NATURE OF INJUNCTIONS 71-3 n.3 (3d ed. New York, Banks,
Gould & Co. 1852); see EDEN, supra note 79, at 71; see also HARRISON, supra note 247, at 544
(“Though it is said . . . that the defendant could not have an injunction, because he had no bill filed; yet
where [a pending suit revealed equities favoring the defendant], the court granted an injunction on the
defendant’s application, though he had no bill filed.”); W.J. JONES, THE ELIZABETHAN COURT OF
CHANCERY 184 (1967) (observing that during Elizabethan times, “the bulk of these writs [of injunction
to stay proceedings at law] were only obtained after the bill had been filed” but noting two ways of
obtaining injunctive relief: “It could be requested in a bill of complaint along with a subpoena, or it
could be asked for by information or motion, once proceedings in Chancery had begun”); 2 STORY,
supra note 75, § 1216, at 572; TURNER, supra note 79, at 377 (recognizing limits on the ability of a
court of equity to grant ancillary relief pursuant to an earlier decree).
Although Eden recognized a distinction between writs of injunction and ancillary relief in the
nature of an injunction, he noted that the distinction was often disregarded in practice. See 2 STORY,
supra note 75, § 1181, at 549 n.1 (“In many cases [equity] enforces it by means of the process of the
writ of injunction, properly so called. But [Eden] proceeds to remark: . . . [‘T]he prohibition has in
numerous cases been issued and conveyed in the shape merely of an order in the nature of an
injunction. . . . The distinction is consequently disregarded in practice, and these orders, though not
enforced by means of the writ of injunction, have indiscriminately obtained the name of injunctions.’”
(citing ROBERT HENLEY EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 290 (London 1821))). The
wearing down of formal distinctions between ancillary and original injunctive relief so early in our
history, acknowledged by Eden and later Justice Story, goes a long way in explaining why the
distinction has since been largely forgotten.
255
See EDEN, supra note 79, at 71; see also 1 WILLIAM BROWN, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND
DETERMINED IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY *183 n.2 (Robert Belt ed., 4th ed. London, A. Strahan
1819) (reprinting Brooks v. Reynolds, (1782) 21 Eng. Rep. 406, 406; 1 Bro. C.C. 183; 2 Dick. 603) (“In
all cases . . . where the Court has, by decree, taken upon itself the administration of assets, it will now
restrain parties suing the executor at law; and it now is unnecessary to file a separate bill for such
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administration later initiated a suit at law claiming title to the assets, the
court of equity would stay the proceeding on motion, rather than on bill
filed.256 Relief by motion was also available where the plaintiff had filed
two actions, one in law and one in equity, for the same claim. Equity would
require the plaintiff to elect his remedy; if he chose the equitable path, the
plaintiff would be enjoined as a matter of course from pursuing the action
at law.257 Third, relief by motion would issue when the plaintiff had
pursued equitable relief without success and later sought to relitigate the
matter by filing a duplicative action at law.258 Early cases suggest that such
ancillary injunctive relief came in the form of an “order” of injunction, as
distinguished from the traditional “writ” of injunction.259
These exceptions, which allowed a party to pursue ancillary equitable
relief without filing a formal bill for a writ of injunction, have a good deal
in common. For starters, they applied to situations in which a proceeding
was first commenced in a court of equity and a subsequent action was
brought in a court of law. Because the parties were already before the court
of equity, there was no reason to insist on the commencement of a new
action in equity with attendant service of process.260 In all of the situations
purpose, since an injunction can be applied for in the existing suit.”); 2 STORY, supra note 75, § 1213,
at 570 (noting that injunctions to prevent creditors from going to other tribunals to assert their rights
were “formerly granted only upon a bill filed” but that injunctions “may now be obtained upon motion
after notice given to the creditor”).
256
See EDEN, supra note 79, at 54, 71; see also Paxton v. Douglas, (1803) 32 Eng. Rep. 456, 456;
8 Ves. 520, 520 (“[T]his Court has made a decree for administration of assets, that decree is in nature of
a judgment for all creditors. The decree cannot be pleaded at law; and therefore . . . if a bill was filed,
the Court has been in the habit of enjoining any creditor.”); 1 TURNER, supra note 79 at 374–75 (noting
the same exception).
257
See EDEN, supra note 79, at 57, 71. An early English case confirms this practice. See Jones v.
Earl of Strafford (1730) 3 P. Wms. 80, 90 (recognizing that the plaintiff must make an election as
between pursuing a claim in law or equity and noting that if the plaintiff elects to proceed in chancery,
“then the proceedings at law are by that order to be stayed by injunction”).
258
See EDEN, supra note 79, at 58–59, 71; NOTTINGHAM, supra note 247, at 83 (“No injunctions
for stay of suits at law are to be granted, revived, dissolved or stayed upon petition . . . . And I think fit
to add a further qualification, vizl. that injunctions to stay suits at law which are commenced contrary
unto the decrees of the Court may be granted at any time upon petition and in time of vacation.”); id. at
147–48 (“Injunctions to stay suits at law contrary to the decrees of the Court may be granted at any
time, and upon petition in the time of vacation.”).
An early English case illustrates this practice. In Brooks v. Reynolds, the Chancellor observed
that where a decree had been made to take account of debts owed and to pay them from the estate, such
that the creditors would have satisfaction under the decree, “he would not permit the defendant to
proceed at law, which would be rendering the decree nugatory.” 21 Eng. Rep. at 406. On those grounds,
the Chancellor granted an injunction to stay proceedings at law. Id.
259
See Kershaw v. Thompson, 4 Johns. Ch. 609 (N.Y. 1820); Dove v. Dove, (1783) 21 Eng. Rep.
411; Dick. 617; 1 Bro. 375; 1 Cox, 101 S.C.
260
WYATT, supra note 18, at 231 (“It is commonly by writ founded on an order of [the court of
chancery]; but may be by word of mouth when the party to be inhibited is actually present in court.”).
A similar result obtained in an early New York chancery decision involving a decree and judicial
sale of mortgaged property. In Kershaw v. Thompson, Chancellor Kent considered the question
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described, moreover, relief by motion was necessitated by a gap in the
doctrine of claim preclusion. As Eden explained, courts of law refused to
take “notice of a decree in equity.”261 As a consequence, a court of equity
could only ensure the effectiveness of its decrees by granting injunctive
relief against inconsistent legal proceedings.262 Eden explained the matters
in terms of the protection or effectuation of equitable authority; courts of
equity were compelled “in support of their jurisdiction, to establish their
decrees by injunction.”263 Eden’s phrasing of the matter anticipates the
forms of ancillary relief that the federal courts would later recognize as
having survived the AIA’s adoption.
2. The Original–Ancillary Distinction and the AIA.—The AIA
appears to pick up the original–ancillary distinction from equity practice,
barring the issuance of “writs of injunction” but saying nothing to foreclose
ancillary relief. While we have yet to find any contemporaneous statements
that describe the Act in precisely these terms, we think that lawyers of the
day would have understood the implications of the AIA’s careful wording.
whether, after declaring the parties’ rights to the mortgaged property, a court of equity could also order
relief in the nature of an injunction requiring the mortgagor to deliver possession of the property, or
whether the purchaser would have to file a separate ejectment action at law. Kent explained:
It does not appear to consist with sound principle, that the Court, which has exclusive authority to
foreclose the equity of redemption of a mortgagor, and can call all the parties in interest before it,
and decree a sale of the mortgaged premises, should not be able even to put the purchaser into
possession against one of the very parties to the suit, and who is bound by the decree. . . . The
distribution of power among the Courts would be injudicious, and the administration of justice
exceedingly defective, and chargeable with much useless delay and expense, if it were necessary
to resort, in the first instance, to a Court of equity, and, afterwards, to a Court of law, to obtain a
perfect foreclosure of a mortgage. . . . [I]t may be safely laid down as a general rule, that the
power to apply the remedy is coextensive with the jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Kershaw, 4 Johns. Ch. at 612–18. Early treatises confirm the use of an “order” of injunction to deliver
possession of land following a decree. See BACON, supra note 244, at 353 (Ordinance 9) (“In case of a
decree made for the possession of land, . . . if he persist in disobedience, an injunction is to be granted
for the possession; and in case also that be disobeyed, then a commission to the sheriff to put him into
possession.”); NOTTINGHAM, supra note 247, at 134–35 (“After affidavit of service and non
performance, there follow of course attachment . . . then an injunction for the possession. . . .
[Thereafter,] in case of resistance a writ of Assistance is to go to the sheriff.”); 2 STORY, supra note 75,
§ 1291, at 637 & n.1 (citing Kershaw and explaining that “Courts of Equity also interfere and effectuate
their own decrees in many cases by injunctions in the nature of a judicial writ or execution for
possession of the property in controversey; as for example by injunctions to . . . deliver . . . possession,
followed up by a writ of assistance”).
261
EDEN, supra note 79, at 54; see also 28 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2, § 4410. An early English
chancery case illustrates the problem. See Morrice v. Bank of Eng., (1736) 36 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ch.); Cas.
t. Talbot 217, 223; 3 Swanst. 573; 2 Bro. P.C. (Toml. ed.) 465. Morrice explained: “[I]t is clear that a
Decree of this Court, if an Action is brought against an Executor on a Bond, is not pleadable, nor can be
given in Evidence against it [in a court of law].” Id. If the chancery court were to have “any
Jurisdiction” then its decrees “must have the same Lien upon Assets as a Judgment at Law.” Id. Thus
the court concluded that “a Decree prior in Time must be prefer’d to a subsequent Judgment” otherwise
“this Court must give up its Jurisdiction.” Id.
262
See EDEN, supra note 79, at 54.
263
Id.
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Indeed, we find that the Court’s own discussions of the equitable powers of
the federal courts in the antebellum period appear to rest on the assumption
that the AIA blocks only original writs and leaves ancillary powers
unconstrained.264
D. Denouement
1. Dismissal of Morris v. Allen.—Others have suggested that the
AIA was designed to provide a legislative solution to the ongoing crisis
triggered by the issuance of the Morris certiorari.265 A variety of factors
support this hypothesis. The litigation remained alive on the circuit court’s
docket through early 1793266 and was an ongoing source of embarrassment
to Justice Iredell, whose appearance as a party to the Morris litigation
disabled him from presiding as a judge over any follow-up proceedings.267
Justice Iredell had brought this disability to the attention of the Chief
Justice in seeking relief from his continuing assignments to the Southern
Circuit.268 We also know that Justice Iredell’s brother-in-law, North
Carolina Senator Samuel Johnston, had been especially solicitous of
Iredell’s circuit burdens; Johnston had engineered the 1792 enactment of a
provision that relieved Iredell of a disproportionate circuit assignment.269

264

Our examination of the Court’s early applications of the AIA reveals that those situations in
which federal courts were permitted to enjoin state proceedings, the supposedly judge-made
“exceptions” to the AIA, are best understood as elaborations of the distinction between original and
ancillary applications for the writ of injunction. See James E. Pfander & Nassim Nazemi, The AntiInjunction Act and the Problem of Federal–State Jurisdictional Overlap, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1, 20–38
(2013) (discussing ancillary exceptions and the rise of AIA “exceptions”).
265
See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 202 n.9 (“It is possible this prohibition [i.e., the anti-injunction
language] was inserted at the behest of Samuel Johnston, a member of the committee that drafted the
bill, as the confrontation between federal and state court jurisdiction in North Carolina arising from the
case of Morris v. Allen was still unresolved.”).
266
Morris’s attorney John Hamilton discontinued the federal court action in June 1793. 2 DHSC,
supra note 9, at 239 n.6.
267
See supra note 137.
268
See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 9; Letter from James Iredell, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court,
to John Jay, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Jan. 17, 1792), in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 238, 238
(citing the pending Morris matter as a continuing reason why Iredell should not ride the Southern
Circuit); Letter from James Iredell, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, to Thomas Johnson, Assoc.
Justice of the Supreme Court (Mar. 15, 1792), in 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 246, 246 (describing the
Morris affair as a “peculiar hardship” counseling against Iredell’s traveling to the Southern Circuit).
269
See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 248 n.6; Wythe Holt, Separation of Powers? Relations Between
the Judiciary and the Other Branches of the Federal Government Before 1803, in NEITHER SEPARATE
NOR EQUAL: CONGRESS IN THE 1790S, at 183, 197 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds.,
2000) (“[T]he justices . . . engaged in much informal lobbying to achieve desired changes in the
judiciary laws. Iredell, for example, frequently dealt with his brother-in-law, Sen. Samuel Johnston of
North Carolina, while Jay persistently exploited his close friendship with Sen. Rufus King of New
York.”). The bill introduced by Senator Johnston on March 20, 1792, became law on April 13, 1792, as
the Circuit Court Act of 1792. 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 248 n.6.
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Johnston also served, with Oliver Ellsworth, on the Senate judiciary
committee that formulated the AIA as part of the Act of 1793.270
The AIA language, if tailored in part to provide a solution to the
Morris certiorari controversy, certainly would have performed that office
capably. It would not have directly addressed the power of a federal circuit
court to issue writs of certiorari to the state courts, but it would have
deprived the North Carolina federal circuit court of the power to grant a
writ of injunction to stay the state court’s Hancock proceeding and would
have thus required the discontinuance of the federal Morris action.271 Such
an approach may have suited Justice Iredell well. While he could not sit in
judgment in the Morris matter, he expressed concern lest the state’s defiant
reaction to the issuance of the certiorari be left to stand as the final word on
the subject.272 Such unresolved defiance might encourage recalcitrance by
other states (as indeed it apparently had in South Carolina, where a similar
set of events had played out273) and cast doubt on the breadth of federal
judicial power. By banning the issuance of writs of injunction to stay
proceedings in state court, Congress would compel the parties to
discontinue the federal proceeding without necessitating any judicial
resolution of the certiorari issue one way or the other.
Morris dropped his federal court action in 1793,274 just a few months
after the AIA became law,275 but it appears that he made the decision much
earlier and for other reasons; perhaps he had grown sensitive to the
concerns of the states as a member of the Senate. A letter dated 1791
indicates that Morris asked his attorney “not to urge it further, that as he
was a Member of the Legislature of the United States, from motives of
Delicacy he wou’d rather the Cause shou’d be proceeded on in the State
Court.”276 Thus ended the Morris tale.
While the Morris litigation ended, the disputed power of the federal
courts to issue writs of certiorari to the state courts apparently remained
alive. Indeed, at least one other federal circuit relied on certiorari to effect
270

See 4 DHSC, supra note 9, at 201 & n.4.
In other words, Morris’s complaint (excerpted supra text accompanying note 91) was an
original bill of injunction—just the sort that the AIA would foreclose.
272
See Letter from James Iredell, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court, to John Jay, Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court (Jan. 17, 1792), in 1 MCREE’S IREDELL, supra note 98, at 337, 338 (“To be sure the
honor of the United States is deeply concerned in their courts deciding solemnly whether the writ issued
erroneously, or ought to be enforced. It is of more importance that it should not go off by an act of
defiance of the State Court, because the General Assembly of North Carolina in their session last
Winter thanked the State Judges for their conduct in disobeying the Writ.”).
273
See Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 108 (discussing a “reprise” of the Morris debacle in March
1793, when South Carolina state judges refused to comply with a certiorari issued by the federal circuit
court). The case was Washington & Beresford v. Huger, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des. Eq.) 360 (1794).
274
See 2 DHSC, supra note 9, at 239 n.6.
275
See Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334–35.
276
See Sitgreaves Letter, supra note 185, at 196–97.
271
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removal of an action from state to federal court in much the way that
Morris had done.277 To the extent that the AIA sought to address federal–
state tension without depriving the federal courts of certiorari power for use
in appropriate circumstances, therefore, it appears that the legislation
achieved its goal.
2. The AIA in the Nineteenth Century.—If framed in the heat of a
controversy over the Morris certiorari case, the AIA certainly had enduring
ramifications. Convention holds that the Supreme Court first applied the
AIA in its 1807 decision in Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott.278 There, the
plaintiffs, Diggs and Keith, obtained a judgment against Wolcott in
Connecticut state court.279 Wolcott, in turn, filed a bill of injunction in
Connecticut state court, seeking to block enforcement of that judgment.280
Diggs and Keith removed the state anti-suit action to the Connecticut
federal circuit court,281 where Wolcott obtained a writ of injunction against
the state judgment.282 Diggs and Keith appealed and the Supreme Court
reversed.283 William Cranch, the Court’s reporter at the time, appears to
have viewed the AIA as a factor in the dismissal; he reported the Court as
having decided that the circuit court “had not jurisdiction to enjoin
proceedings in a state court.”284 Although the Diggs Court did not mention
the AIA by name, the wording of Cranch’s report285 has suggested to
subsequent observers (as it does to us) that the dismissal was based on a
finding that the AIA foreclosed the assertion of jurisdiction over actions to
stay proceedings in state court.286 Indeed the Court itself cited Diggs as an
277

See Washington & Beresford, 1 Des. Eq. at 361–62; see also Holt & Perry, supra note 5, at 108
(discussing Washington & Beresford); Note, supra note 37, at 622 (same).
278
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 179 (1807).
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
As the defendants in equity, statutory removal was a route available to Diggs and Keith. Recall
that Morris, the plaintiff in equity, had no such option and hence resorted to certiorari. See supra notes
106–09 and accompanying text.
282
Diggs, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 179.
283
Id.
284
Id. at 180. According to the clerk’s entry in the official minutes, available in the National
Archives, the Supreme Court ruled for the defendants on the ground that the federal circuit court lacked
jurisdiction “in this cause.” Appellate Case Files of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1792–1831
(Feb. 26, 1807) (National Archives Microfilm Publication No. 215, file 230, roll 1) (on file with
authors).
285
A summary in the margin of the Cranch report states in its entirety: “A court of the United
States cannot enjoin proceedings in a state court.” Diggs, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 179. Compare that to the
language of the AIA: “nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a
state.” Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 335.
286
See Toucey v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 134 (1941) (“The early decisions of this Court
applied the Act of 1793 as a matter of course.” (citing Diggs, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 179)); id. at 134 n.5
(“The first case arising under the [anti-injunction] provision was Diggs & Keith v. Wolcott . . . .”); Peck
v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 612, 625 (1849) (citation omitted) (“The [1793 Act] declares that a writ of
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early application of the AIA, in its 1849 decision Peck v. Jenness.287 Thus,
it seems that parties relatively close in time to the Diggs disposition
consistently read the Diggs dismissal as an apparent application of the AIA.
Even if Diggs did not so hold (as others have argued288), the willingness of
well-informed observers to treat the case as one to which the AIA was
thought to apply may have some persuasive force.
The conventional reading of Diggs comports with our account of the
AIA. Indeed, Diggs was a virtual replay of the Morris v. Allen litigation: in
an action removed from a state court of equity, a federal circuit court
agreed to issue an original writ of injunction to stay proceedings in state
court. But this time, the AIA stood in the way. What’s more, the Diggs
decision may explain why the AIA received scant attention in the
nineteenth century. Having foreclosed federal interposition in state court
proceedings, the Court had clarified that the AIA barred original “writs of
injunction.”
Another nineteenth-century case, French v. Hay,289 reveals the flip side
of the original–ancillary distinction. Said to be the first decision in which
the Supreme Court recognized “exceptions” to the “absolute prohibition of
the injunction statute,”290 French arose from the removal of a state court
proceeding to the Virginia federal circuit court.291 Following removal and a
decree for the defendant, the federal court granted an injunction against
further proceedings by the losing party either in the Virginia or
Pennsylvania state courts (where the plaintiff had sued to enforce the

injunction shall not be granted ‘to stay proceedings in any court of a State.’ In the case of Diggs v.
Wolcott, the decree of the Circuit Court had enjoined the defendant from proceeding in a suit pending
in a State court, and this court reversed the decree, because it had no jurisdiction to enjoin proceedings
in a State court.”).
287
48 U.S. (7 How.) at 625.
288
Professor Mayton resists the conventional explanation in an effort to preserve the viability of his
claim that the AIA limits only the power of single Justices rather than the power of courts. See Mayton,
supra note 5, at 332, 339–40. Mayton argued that the dismissal may have been based on the Court’s
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Virginia state court’s judgment).292 The plaintiff invoked the AIA, but the
Court rejected its application.293
The French decision appears to reflect a conclusion that the relief in
question was ancillary in character and did not run afoul of the AIA’s
restriction on writs of injunction brought by original bill. Early in its
opinion, the Court explained that the federal court’s injunctive proceeding
was “not an original one.”294 Rather, the Court explained, “[i]t is auxiliary
and dependent in its character.”295 As a consequence, the Court found that
the “prohibition . . . against the granting of injunctions by the courts of the
United States touching proceedings in State courts has no application
here.”296 The prior jurisdiction of the federal court was said to take “the
case out of the operation of that provision.”297 While scholars have viewed
this as ipse dixit,298 we see a clear expression of the idea that the AIA was
meant to limit only the issuance of original writs of injunction and to leave
a federal court free to grant injunctive relief to effectuate a decree
involving parties otherwise properly before that court.
CONCLUSION
By the mid-twentieth century, the original–ancillary distinction that
the eighteenth-century drafters had embedded in the AIA’s limiting
reference to “writs of injunction” had disappeared from view. A variety of
factors combined to consign the statutory distinction to “obscurity.” Law
and equity had been merged; the original bill of injunction had given way
to a single “civil action” that was meant to provide an all-purpose vehicle
for the assertion of claims in federal court.299 As a result, courts of equity
no longer routinely entertained original bills of injunction to stay
proceedings in the courts of law pending the resolution of equitable
defenses; such equitable defenses as fraud and mistake were available in
the context of a single merged civil action. In short, changes in the nature
of legal practice made a once-familiar feature of equity remote and
inaccessible.
These changes were complete in 1941, when Justice Frankfurter
encountered the AIA in the well-known case of Toucey v. New York Life
Insurance Co.300 Frankfurter was a brilliant legal theorist and a close
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student of the history of the federal court system, but he had precious little
experience in the practice of law.301 Acting on progressive impulses,302
Frankfurter used the opportunity presented in Toucey to rethink the AIA.
To Frankfurter, it was obvious that the ban on writs of injunction had been
intended, whatever the Act’s origins, as an absolute barrier to federal
equitable interposition in pending state court proceedings. The exceptions
that courts had developed over time were discarded; they were simply the
product of “loose” language and a regrettable lack of judicial restraint.303
Time, to some extent, has marched on. Congress restored the
exceptions to the Act in a 1948 codification of the AIA that survives to this
day and authorizes federal courts to stay state court proceedings in aid of
their jurisdiction and to effectuate their judgments.304 But Frankfurter’s
account continues to shape conventional understanding of the Act. The
Court today regards the AIA as an important barrier to equitable
interposition and treats the exceptions as subjects of narrow
interpretation.305 While the Court neutralized the AIA to some extent in
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constitutional litigation,306 the doctrine of equitable restraint draws on
Frankfurter’s conception of the Act in defining limits on federal power to
stay pending criminal proceedings.307
Our account of the history of the AIA calls Frankfurter’s view into
question. The political context in which the AIA was adopted suggests that
the Act sought to tackle an important but limited problem that the North
Carolina litigation in Morris v. Allen had uncovered. Drawing on
eighteenth-century chancery practice, with its distinction between original
process for “writs of injunction” and ancillary relief to defend federal
power, we have proposed a more nuanced sense of what the AIA meant to
prohibit and to leave in place. The limiting textual reference to writs of
injunction both confirms the Act’s connection to the Morris controversy
and explains (and to some extent justifies) the judicial recognition of AIA
exceptions in the nineteenth century.
And yet the historical puzzle remains. Frankfurter, the great apostle of
judicial restraint, acted to foreclose what he perceived as judge-made
exceptions to a statute that he regarded as self-evidently absolute in its
prohibition. Viewed from the perspective on the Act’s origins that we
develop here, Frankfurter begins to look like something of an activist
himself. When we revisit his Toucey opinion with a better appreciation of
the origins of the 1793 Act, Frankfurter appears to have acted as much
from a distrust of federal equity as from a desire to honor the intentions of
Congress. Dissenting in Toucey, Justice Reed gave voice to a concern with
Justice Frankfurter’s headlong decision to end the relitigation exception.
Reed explained “that courts of equity had long exercised the power to
entertain bills to carry their decrees into execution by injunction against the
parties.”308 He could not believe that Congress would draft a statute in
which “[s]uch needed powers would . . . be lightly withdrawn.”309 We find
it striking that the powers to which Justice Reed referred were the very
ones Congress restored to the statute in 1948.310 We find it all the more
striking that they had been hiding in plain sight all along, in the language of
the carefully drafted text of a much misunderstood piece of early republic
legislation.
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